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This dissertation contains three chapters that examine the effect of price in
higher education. The first chapter considers the effect of community college tu-
ition on college enrollment using a natural experiment in Texas where discounts
for community college tuition were expanded over time and across geography.
Additionally, the long-term effects of community college are examined including
transfer to universities and graduation with a bachelor’s degree. This chapter uses
Texas administrative data from 1994-2012 on the universe of high school graduates
and their college enrollment and graduation. For high school graduates, commu-
nity college enrollment in the first year after high school increased by 7.1 percent-
age points for a $1,000 decrease in tuition. Lower tuition also increased transfer
from community colleges to universities. There is also marginally statistically sig-
nificant evidence that attending a community college increased the probability of
earning a bachelors degree within eight years of high school graduation by 23 per-
centage points.
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The second chapter examines whether students respond to immediate fi-
nancial incentives when choosing their college major. From 2006-07 to 2010-11,
low-income students in technical or foreign language majors could receive up
to $8,000 in Federal Science and Mathematics Access to Retain Talent (SMART)
Grants. Since income-eligibility was determined using a strict threshold, this chap-
ter determines the causal impact of the grant on student major with a regression
discontinuity design. Using administrative data from public universities in Texas,
it is estimated that income-eligible students were 3.2 percentage points more likely
than their ineligible peers to major in targeted fields. Brigham Young University
had a larger impact of 10.1 percentage points.
The third chapter considers the effect of financial aid arising from students
being declared financially independent on educational outcomes including reen-
rollment, credits attempted, and graduation. Students who are 24 at the end of
the calender year cannot be declared dependent while students who are 23 at the
end of the year can be. This sharp change in eligibility is leveraged to compare
dependent students to independent students in a regression discontinuity frame-
work. The analysis uses administrative data from from all public universities and
colleges in Texas from 2003-04 to 2013-14. Financial independence is associated
with modest changes in educational outcomes.
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Chapter 1
College on the Cheap: Costs and Benefits of
Community College
1.1 Introduction
Understanding the decision to enroll in post-secondary education and its
long-run consequences has long been a topic of interest to economists as well as
policymakers. There is now much work focusing on student investment in four-
year colleges; however, much less is known about investment in and consequences
of community college. This is despite the fact that, in 2011, community college
students represented 45 percent of all students enrolled in higher education and
42 percent of first time freshmen.1
Community colleges have recently received increased attention due to a
proposal by the President that would make community college free. This pro-
posal has been the subject of much debate but very little is known about the effect
of community college price on the enrollment patterns of students or the impact
on long term educational outcomes. This study focuses on fundamental questions
about the proposal. The first question addressed is what is the effect of community
1I will refer to two-year schools as community colleges throughout this paper, though in princi-
ple two-year colleges can include technical schools as well as community colleges. These statistics
are calculated by the American Association of Community Colleges using the 2012 NPSAS.
1
college price on enrollment patterns of students? The second is what is the effect
of decreased tuition on the long term educational outcomes of students?
Community colleges are a large part of the United States higher education
system, but very little is known about the price sensitivity of community college
enrollment and long-term educational consequences of community college atten-
dance.2 This paper attempts to fill this void by exploring the effect of price on
community college attendance using a novel identification strategy that exploits
plausibly exogenous variation in community college tuition. It further explores
the effects of community college attendance on educational attainment.
Community colleges differ from four-year universities in many ways. Un-
like many universities, community colleges are open-enrollment which means they
are open to any student who has a high school diploma or GED credential.3 Com-
munity colleges students are more likely than four-year university students to be
from backgrounds with historically lower educational attainment such as racial
minorities and low-income families and are also more likely to be the first gen-
eration of college students in their family Nunez and Carrol (1998); Bailey et al.
(2005). Consequently, understanding community colleges may lend new insights
into understanding socioeconomic gaps in educational attainment and income.
Community colleges also stand in contrast to many other college options
in that they are substantially less costly to attend. In 2010-2011, average annual
2Kane and Rouse (1999) provide a summary of community colleges, their history and impacts.
3Community colleges often offer remedial courses that enable students without a high school
diploma or GED to eventually enroll in community college
2
community college tuition was $2,439 while average tuition at public four-year
institutions was $7,136, with private four-year institutions being even more costly
at $22,771. After adjusting for inflation, public four-year college tuition has risen
241 percent since 1981 while community college tuition has risen at a slower pace
of 159 percent. National Center for Education Statistics (2014) Community colleges
may become more attractive as four-year college costs continue to rise faster than
community college costs. In fact, the net price of community college (accounting
for financial aid) actually decreased from 2000 to 2009 while four-year net college
price increased over the same period Gillen et al. (2011).
Estimating the effect of community college price on enrollment has been
difficult for at least three reasons. The first is measurement; in most settings, the
cost of community college is not observed by the researcher because tuition is paid
only by students who enrolled in college. For students who do not attend com-
munity college it is not clear which price was the relevant price for their decision.
I overcome this challenge by using a feature of Texas community colleges where
students receive a tuition discount if they attend the local community college. This
feature makes the local community college’s price the relevant tuition for most stu-
dents.4 The second is identification: even in settings where the relevant commu-
nity college tuition is known for each student, community college tuition may be
set in ways that reflect unobserved characteristics about the community college’s
base of potential students. I overcome the challenge in identification by leverag-
4This feature also gives a rule for assigning community college price even for students who did
not attend community college.
3
ing changes in students’ eligibility for community college tuition discounts across
time and geography. The third difficulty associated with estimation is the stringent
data requirements–one needs data that links enrollment and tuition. I am able to
use administrative records on all public high school graduates in Texas and their
college enrollment.
I leverage the expansion of discounts for tuition in a differences in differ-
ences framework to examine the effect of reduced community college tuition on
college enrollment. I find that a $1,000 decrease in community college tuition in-
creases immediate enrollment in community colleges by 5.1 percentage points (pp)
relative to a baseline of 26.5 pp, and also increases attendance at community col-
lege in the year after high school by 7.1 pp relative to a base of 38.4 pp.
Moreover, estimating the effect of community college on long-run educa-
tional outcomes is difficult because different types of students choose to enroll in
community college (versus no college or a four-year university), and simple OLS
estimates will be biased. The long-run effects of community college can be studied
by finding a situation where community college enrollment is altered by a factor
unrelated to unobserved student characteristics. I examine exactly such a situa-
tion using the variation in community college enrollment induced by expansions
of community college tuition discounts. I find that community college attendance
increases both two-year and bachelor’s degree receipt. The increase in educational
attainment is apparent for students who switch enrollment from universities to
community colleges as well as for students who are induced to attend community
college who would not have attended any college otherwise.
4
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the conceptual frame-
work for enrollment responses to community college costs and the long term ef-
fects of community college enrollment. Section 1.3 describes the institutional set-
ting explored in this paper. Section 1.4 describes the data. Section 1.5 discusses
the identification strategy and results for the effect of community college price on
enrollment. Section 1.6 discusses the identification strategy used to examine the
longer run effects of community college as well as the estimated effects of com-
munity college on longer run outcomes. Section 1.7 discusses how the effects esti-
mated differ by race, gender, and income. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes
1.2 Conceptual Framework
1.2.1 Costs of College
Economic theory predicts that lowering the costs of college will increase
college enrollment. This common sense prediction is verified in prior work that
generally finds a $1,000 decrease in college costs leads to a 2-4 pp increase in en-
rollment. Dynarski (2000, 2003, 2004); Scott-Clayton (2011); Castleman and Long
(2013); Seftor and Turner (2002); Turner (2011).5 However, these studies do not
generally distinguish between two-year and four-year college costs because they
study grants that apply to both community colleges and universities. This paper
expands the work on price sensitivity of college enrollment by specifically exam-
ining the effects of community college costs on community college and university
enrollment.
5Deming and Dynarski (2009) summarize this literature.
5
One might expect larger effects for changes in community college tuition
than for increases in financial aid primarily used at universities for several rea-
sons.6 On average, community colleges serve a lower-income population that may
be more price sensitive. Also, a $1,000 reduction in tuition in costs represents a sub-
stantially higher fraction of total costs at community colleges than at universities
so students may have a stronger response to the same dollar amount reduction in
community college costs as compared to universities. Lastly, studies using cross-
state variation have found larger effects for community college price sensitivity
than for universities (Kane, 1995; Rouse, 1994).7 However, these studies should
be interpreted with caution as they may capture other factors like changing policy
objectives of states rather than changes in community college enrollment caused
by changes in community college costs. This work expands the large literature on
the price sensitivity of college enrollment by providing compelling evidence on
the effect of community college prices on enrollment.
In concurrent work, Martorell et al. (2014) examine the effect of community
college prices on college enrollment in Texas by leveraging variation in community
college tuition induced by taxing districts. They conclude that living in community
college taxing districts increases college attendance. While they use similar insti-
6Other costs of college have been shown to be relevant for community college enrollment in-
cluding distance Jepsen and Montgomery (2009); Miller (2007) and weak labor markets Betts and
McFarland (1995).
7However, Hilmer (1997) finds that the price elasticity for community colleges is lower than it
is for universities. Nutting (2008) also examines the enrollment elasticity of community college
enrollment using cross-campus, cross-year variation in community colleges in New York and finds
that there is a negative relationship between community college enrollment and price. However,
the estimates are not easily interpretable as rates of community college attendance.
6
tutional features for identification, the identifying assumptions are quite different
than those used in this paper. They compare students who live on opposite sides
of district boundaries who face different community college costs and argue that
the students are otherwise equivalent. Martorell et al. (2014) builds on McFarlin
(2007) which uses a similar strategy and administrative data in Texas. A key con-
cern is whether students who live on opposite sides of the boundaries sort based
on educational amenities. Kane et al. (2006) explores student sorting and finds that
sorting across school district boundaries does occur. My paper uses variation in-
duced by changes in these boundaries over time, thereby comparing individuals
who live in the same K-12 school districts.
Moreover, the setting described in this paper allows me to identify both the
own price enrollment elasticity of community college and the cross price elasticity
for four-year enrollment due to precise measurement of community college tu-
ition. Prior studies have largely focused on the effect of a $1,000 change in tuition.
However, the interpretation of this parameter across time and different college set-
tings is difficult as the value of $1,000 changes and represents a different fraction of
total price. Estimating an elasticity allows a comparison across time and different
settings because it is unitless.
There is also a related literature that examines the changes in enrollment
patterns that occur when the costs of one sector of post secondary education are
decreased and the costs of other sectors are held constant. Prior work has focused
on subsidies for in-state colleges, and the present study expands that literature by
focusing on a different sector–community college. Cornwell et al. (2006); Goodman
7
(2008); Cohodes and Goodman (2014) find that students were less likely to attend
out of state colleges when scholarships that reduced the cost of attending in state
were implemented. Cohodes and Goodman (2014) also document that the change
in student enrollment patterns reduced graduation rates. Similarly, I examine the
long term effects of a change in the relative price of community college on edu-
cational outcomes like graduation and credits attempted similar to Cohodes and
Goodman (2014).
It is not clear which students will respond to decreases in the price of com-
munity college. Students who enroll in community college due to decreased costs
could come from two groups: students who were planning on attending four-year
universities or students who were not going to enroll in college. Knowing who
responds to community college price changes is important for policymakers con-
sidering the effects of community college tuition. Existing work has not explicitly
considered who is attracted to community colleges when community college price
changes, and this study will be able to answer this question.
1.2.2 Educational Attainment
Increased access to community colleges has a theoretically ambiguous ef-
fect on ultimate educational attainment.8 As articulated by Rouse (1995), there are
two competing forces that affect educational attainment when there is increased
access to community college: democratization and diversion. Democratization
8In this paper, increased access to community college will be caused by decreased community
college tuition.
8
occurs when students switch from no college enrollment to enrollment in commu-
nity college which would have positive effect on overall educational attainment.
However, the diversion effect occurs when increasing access to community college
diverts students from four-year universities to two-year colleges. Diversion could
reduce overall educational attainment if students who switch do not go on to get a
bachelor’s degree. This paper will provide quasi-experimental evidence of which
effect dominates.
Separating the democratization effect from the diversion effect is difficult
because selection into community college is nonrandom. This study overcomes
this challenge and presents quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of commu-
nity college attendance on educational attainment by using variation in commu-
nity college attendance caused by expansions of community college discounts over
time and geography. This variation over time and geography provides “as if ran-
dom” variation in community college attendance. Goodman et al. (2014) is relevant
to this study as they examine SAT cutoffs for admissions to four-year universities.
Failure to meet these cutoffs make students more likely to attend community col-
lege or not enroll in college. They find that switching from non-enrollment or
community college attendance to university attendance increases bachelor’s de-
gree receipt, suggesting that the diversion effect dominates.9 Moreover, McFarlin
9Other work has primarily used two approaches to address nonrandom selection into commu-
nity college. The first is distance to college instruments Rouse (1995); Long and Kurlaender (2009)
where the validity of the assumption of the exclusion restriction has been shown to be tenuous
Card (2001). The second is and propensity score matching that controls for desired schooling levels
and assumes that sorting into community college is random after controlling carefully for school-
ing intentions and other observable characteristics Reynolds (2012); Doyle (2009); Leigh and Gill
9
(2007) finds that initially attending community colleges decreases bachelor’s de-
gree attainment in the first five years after high school by comparing students in
community college taxing districts to students not in community college taxing
districts.
Additionally, Brand et al. (2014) makes it clear that choosing the comparison
group is critical when examining the long-term effects of community college. In
this paper, I will separately examine the long term effects of community college
for students who would have attended a university but were induced to switch to
community college as well as students who would not have attended any college
and were induced to switch to community college.
1.3 Texas Community College System
Community colleges typically provide both academic and vocational train-
ing whereas universities focus on academic subjects. Academic training at commu-
nity colleges is designed to award associates degrees and help students transition
to a four-year university. Technical training typically takes the form of a certificate
program and offers vocational skills.
Texas provides an ideal laboratory to study community college enrollment;
there are 50 public community colleges, each serving distinct geographical areas.10
Specific municipalities pay ad-valorem property taxes to support each commu-
(2003); Brand et al. (2014). The results from these studies are mixed with some studies suggesting
democratization and others diversion.
10In addition to the 50 public community colleges the Texas State Technical College System and
Lamar State University system also provide public, two-year college options.
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nity college.11 Students who live in municipalities that pay property taxes sup-
porting a community college are eligible for reduced tuition at that college called
“in-district” tuition; I will use this policy for identification.12 The boundaries of
community college taxing districts where students are eligible for in-district tu-
ition is shown in Figure 1.1. For the 2014-2015 school year, community colleges in
Texas will charge 63 percent more, on average, to out-of-district students relative to
in-district students. This paper leverages over 20 expansions in taxing boundaries
that have occurred since 1995 that induced large changes in tuition. The timing of
these expansions is outlined in Table 1.1.
Importantly for my identification strategy five community colleges in Texas
have expanded their taxing district through annexation of municipalities. The first
annexation contained in the data occurred in 1995 and, in total, 22 municipalities
joined a community college district. These expansions have increased the number
of students eligible for reduced, “in-district” tuition.13 The colleges that have ex-
panded and are the focus of my study are Austin Community College, Lone Star
College, Amarillo College, Houston Community College, and Hill College.14 Table
11This in-district feature of community college tuition pricing is present in a few other states
namely Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. These states do not necessarily have this feature at all
community colleges in the state but do at at least some community colleges. In the 2012-2013 school
year nearly 70 percent of community college students in Texas were paying in-district tuition.
12The exception is El Paso Community which does not offer a discount to students who live in
the taxing district.
13There has been one additional annexation at Brazosport College after the time covered by the
data. Also there was an additional annexation for Austin Community College of the City of Austin
in 2005, but this annexation does not map into a school district as it annexed only parts of school
districts and is excluded for this reason.
14Lone Star College was known as North Harris Montgomery Community College District prior
11
1.1 lists the expansions and Figure 1.2 shows the districts annexed. These colleges
represent a range of sizes and geographies with Hill College being in a rural setting
and having just over 4,000 students enrolled in Fall 2013 and Lone Star College in
Houston having over 61,000 students enrolled in the same year. It is the variation
in community college price induced by annexations of municipalities that I will
use for my identification.
In order for a tax entity to be added to the taxing district for a community
college, the residents must gather signatures for a petition to vote on annexation
into the community college taxing district. After a petition has a sufficient number
of signatures, a vote authorizing an increase in property taxes is taken. The in-
crease in property taxes is on the order of $.10 per $100 of property value, although
it varies by college. Community colleges use the property tax revenue from their
taxing district as well as other sources of revenue including state appropriations,
and tuition and fees to fund their operations. As soon as a municipality approves
the property tax, students begin paying in-district tuition as opposed to out-of-
district tuition. The assumptions required to use these annexations as variation in
community college tuition will be discussed further in Section 1.5.
Many times the vote for annexation also includes plans for new facilities be-
ing built in the annexed area. Table 1.1 contains a list of relevant campus building
projects and building open dates. Additional campuses reduce the costs of attend-
ing community college and may influence both non-monetary costs like conve-
to 2007.
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nience and monetary costs.15 I will control for the presence of new campuses to
isolate the change in tuition associated with annexation.
1.4 Data
The data for this project come from several sources. The primary student-
level data come from the Texas Education Research Center (ERC) and cover the
school years that start from 1994-2012 although the primary estimating sample will
focus on 1994-2005.16 These data contain demographic and academic performance
information for all students in public K-12 schools in Texas provided by the Texas
Education Agency. These records are linked to individual level enrollment, gradu-
ation, and financial aid data from all public institutions of higher education in the
state of Texas as well as many private institutions using data provided by the Texas
Higher Education Coordinating Board. Data on tuition comes from the Texas As-
sociation of Community Colleges and contains tuition information starting in 1992.
Data on tuition is on the sticker price of attendance rather than on tuition actually
paid by students. However, sticker price is particularly relevant in the community
college setting and is very close to what is actually paid by students. Sticker versus
actual price will be discussed further in Section 1.5. County level unemployment
rates for August of each year from the Bureau of Labor Statistics are also used.
I assembled information on community college districts in Texas by visiting
15New campuses are often located relatively close to existing campuses and as such are unlikely
to affect the decision to live at home if attending community college.
16For a description of these data see http://www.utaustinerc.org/
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each community college’s website and through conversations with administrators
in cases of ambiguity.17 Historical information for each school district’s annexa-
tion history was obtained several ways. For a detailed description of determining
annexation dates see Appendix A.1.1.
1.4.1 Measuring Tuition Status
Eligibility for in-district tuition depends on the taxing district of a student’s
residence. The ERC data do not contain precise address information or taxing dis-
trict information, so in-district status for the purposes of this paper is inferred by
the in-district status of a student’s high school. In all instances in this study, the
boundaries for community college taxing districts are defined by school districts
which means eligibility is observed with smaller error than when using other geo-
graphic boundaries. However, there are several reasons for measurement error in
taxing district residence including attending a high school for which the student
does not live in the boundary and students who move the year after high school.
For students who attend community college, the data contain whether they
paid in-district or out-of-district tuition. Panel B of Figure 1.3 shows that eligibility
for in-district tuition increases sharply in the year of annexation. This figure is cre-
ated using students who graduated from K-12 school districts that would experi-
ence annexation and plots the fraction who paid in-district tuition while attending
community college. This figure should be interpreted with caution as annexation
17The information compiled from school websites for the district of each school is available upon
request.
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will be shown to cause students to enroll in community college, but it is useful
for illustrating the discrete change in payment of in-district tuition. Ideally, the
data would reveal the change in the fraction of students eligible for in-district tu-
ition. However, only the change in students actually paying in-district tuition can
be measured. In the period after annexation, some students will have their in-
district status changed and other students will not. The new attendees are likely to
be students who did experience a change in tuition status because those students
face lower tuition costs. For this reason, the plotted or estimated change in in-
district tuition payment is likely to increase more than the change in the eligibility
for in-district tuition.
Prior to annexation around 15 percent of students are paying in-district tu-
ition; after annexation the number is approximately 80 percent. In the first year
of annexation there appears to be some slippage, with approximately 60 percent
of annexed students paying in-district tuition. This could be explained by admin-
istrative issues in the implementation of annexation. In the data for individual
K-12 districts, the first year of annexation often has a smaller fraction paying in-
district tuition than subsequent years which suggests that the slippage is not due
to measurement error in the annexation date. Figure 1.3 demonstrates that the
annexations did affect the price paid by students for community college.
When interpreting the effects of a $1,000 change in tuition it is important
to remember that tuition is assigned to change for all students who attended a
K-12 district that was annexed. However, Table 1.4 show that among students
who enrolled in community college, 55 percent of students changed from out-of-
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district to in-district. As previously discussed, the 55 percent estimate is likely to
be an overestimate because students who are eligible for in-district tuition are more
likely to attend community college and thus appear in the data than students who
are not eligible for in-district tuition. To further reduce the measurement error
in tuition, estimates that measure the effect of a $1,000 tuition change should be
scaled up by dividing by .55 (or multiplying by 1.8). Because .55 is likely to be
an overestimate of the true change in in-district eligibility, dividing by .55 will not
scale up the results as much as if the coefficients were divided by the true, smaller
estimate. As such, dividing by .55 is likely to be a lower bound on the effect of a
$1,000 change in tuition. For this reason, results that are scaled by tuition will also
be scaled by the change in in-district eligibility.
Another important consideration for interpretation is how annexation af-
fects the net price of college. To this point, I have focused on changes in tuition
but annexation could also affect grants and influence net price through changes in
grant aid.18 If decreases in tuition are offset by decreases in grant payments, then
the magnitude of the change in tuition will overstate the actual change in the costs
of college.
I investigate this by examining the patterns of grants received. Only stu-
dents who enroll in community college are observed, and prior results show that
annexation is related to additional students enrolling in community college. Be-
18Grants will be defined as the annual amount of Federal Pell Grants, Federal Supplemental
Educational Opportunity Grants, TEXAS Grants, and Texas Public Education Grants. All of these
grants are need-based but are funded by different sources. TEXAS Grants are funded by the state
and Texas Public Education Grants are funded by individual colleges.
16
cause annexation affects enrollment, and thus the sample used in estimation, the
result on grants should be viewed as descriptive rather than causal. Data on grants
disbursed starts in 2001 and so results presented will be from 2001 to 2012. Column
3 of Table 1.4 examines the effect of annexation on grant aid received at community
colleges and finds a statistically imprecise decrease in grant aid received of $173.
When considering only students who received some grants at a community college
in Column 4 of Table 1.4, the average amount of grants received went down after
annexation by $286. Even after accounting for imperfect measurement of eligibility
this represents roughly half of the change in tuition. However, the number of stu-
dents receiving grants at community colleges during this time period is relatively
small with 15-20 percent receiving non zero grants.19 This suggests that there may
be small countervailing effect of reduced grants, but this only affects a minority of
high school graduates. The evidence on changes in grants suggests that the results
may be biased downwards.
1.4.2 Constructing the Sample
The sample used for analysis consists of students who graduated from Texas
public high schools when 17 or 18 years old between 1994 and 2005. I will first
examine the immediate transition of these students to college. Studying on-time
graduates of high school and their enrollment behavior in the fall after their gradu-
ation has the advantage that on-time high school graduates were unable to manip-
19This is likely due to issues explored in the literature on FAFSA take up and financial aid com-
plexity Bettinger et al. (2012); Dynarski and Wiederspan (2012).
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ulate the timing of their entry into college as a result of changing tax jurisdictions.
This is because the annexation vote takes place during their senior year. Students
who were out of high school for some time may wait to enroll in college until after
a vote is taken. However, examining recent high school graduates will only cap-
ture part of the total effect of annexation and lower tuition on community college
enrollment. For instance, lower tuition is also likely to attract other students to “go
back” to school.
Because the sample is selected from high school graduates the estimates
may be biased if annexation changes the probability of graduation from high school.
This might happen if students see the opportunity for less costly post secondary
schooling and change their effort. This is tested in Panel B of Table 2.2 which
shows that students do not change high school graduation behavior in response to
less expensive community college tuition.
For the majority of the analysis, the sample is limited to students who grad-
uated from high school from 1994-2005. This allows an examination of graduation
outcomes like bachelor’s degree receipt eight years after high school. I also use stu-
dents from 1994-2012 for enrollment outcomes to take advantage of additional an-
nexations that occur from 2006-2012, and these results are discussed in Appendix
A.1.2. The sample is limited to students from K-12 school districts that are part of a
community college taxing district that experienced annexation from 1994 to 2005.
As a result, all K-12 districts in the sample will be part of a community college tax-
ing district by 2005. This restriction causes the sample to consist of approximately
18
15 percent of high school graduates in Texas during this time period.20
Table 3.1 contains summary statistics for the primary estimating sample
which includes high school graduates from 1995 to 2006. K-12 districts that expe-
rienced annexation makes up 39 percent of the observations and post-annexation
observations account for 25 percent of the observations. Over 26 percent of stu-
dents attend community college immediately after high school graduation, and
24.7 percent attend public universities. Table 1.3 splits the data for the districts
that experienced annexation before and after the annexation. After annexation
there are increases in community college enrollment, in-district community col-
lege enrollment, payment of in-district tuition, graduation probability, and credit
hours at community colleges and universities. Tuition drops from $1962 annually
to $1160. These preview the results, but the patterns described here generally hold
upon more precise statistical examination.
1.5 Community College Price Sensitivity
1.5.1 Identification
The first goal of this paper is to uncover the effect of community college
tuition on enrollment patterns. This is difficult for a number of reasons. First,
in many settings it is not clear which community college tuition is relevant for
students making enrollment decisions. Second, even in settings where the rel-
evant community college tuition is easy to assign, finding variation in costs of
20For analysis that includes years up to 2012 the sample is expanded to include a new community
college taxing district that experienced annexation, Houston Community College.
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community college unrelated to underlying student characteristics is difficult. For
instance, cross sectional differences in community college tuition are likely to rep-
resent unobserved differences in the areas that support the community colleges.
Temporal variation in community college price may arise from business cycle fluc-
tuations or secular trends in college costs.
To address these issues, I exploit previously described institutional features
of the Texas community college system. For the assignment of community college
tuition I leverage the fact that Texas students face differential tuition depending
on their residence. The system of in-district tuition creates a rule that assigns the
relevant community college tuition. Namely, prior to a K-12 district’s annexation
the price of community college is the out-of-district price and after annexation, it is
the in-district price. I also overcome the challenge of tuition being set in response
to student characteristics by exploiting sharp changes in tuition within K-12 school
districts over time by using taxing district annexation (which represents a substan-
tial shock to the cost of community college for students).
To identify the causal impacts of tuition on enrollment, I implement a dif-
ferences in differences estimator by comparing enrollment of annexed districts to
districts already in a taxing district before and after annexation takes place. The
language of a quasi-experiment will be employed with annexed K-12 districts be-
ing referred to as the treatment group and districts already included in the com-
munity college taxing districts being referred to as the control group.21 Because the
21The control K-12 districts are already included in the taxing district of the college. These dis-
tricts are likely to be most similar to annexed districts because they are in the same locality and they
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variation in tuition occurs at the K-12 district/year level I cluster standard errors at
the district level.22 To examine the effect of annexation or treatment the following
reduced form equation is estimated:
Yicdt = θ · Annexationdt +Xidtα +Wtcβ + γd + ηt + τtc + icdt (1.1)
Importantly, i indexes individuals, d indexes K-12 districts, t indexes school year,
c indexes community college district, and icdt represents an idiosyncratic error
term. Yicdt is a student enrollment outcome like attendance at community college
and Annexationdt is an indicator for a K-12 district d that has been annexed in year
t. As such, θ is parameter of interest and is the effect of annexation and the atten-
dant reduced tuition on a student outcome. Variables that control for K-12 district
characteristics that may be related to college-going are included in Xidt like race,
gender, an indicator for economic disadvantage, and limited English proficiency.23
Xidt also includes an indicator for a new campus of the community college being
open in the K-12 district. Wct contains covariates that control for factors affecting
college attendance at the community college district level like county unemploy-
ment rates and number of high school seniors in the graduating cohort; these are
only included in specifications without college/year fixed effects.24
have access to community college services. Choosing K-12 districts that were never treated would
be problematic because the students are further away from the community college and are less
likely to attend the community college under consideration. The control districts were all annexed
prior to 1992 or were included initially in the formation of the taxing district.
22Performing the analysis on data collapsed into K-12 school district/year cells that are weighted
by the number of high school graduates in the cell yields very similar results.
23Economic disadvantage is determined by free and reduced lunch receipt.
24Bound and Turner (2007) find that large cohort sizes within states lead to low educational
attainment, so I control for cohort size explicitly.
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In addition to district characteristics, fixed effects for K-12 district, γd, and
year, ηt, are included. These fixed effects control for fixed observed and unob-
served characteristics of K-12 districts. They also control for fixed community col-
lege characteristics as K-12 districts comprise the community college taxing dis-
trict. Year fixed effects account for trends in community college enrollment and for
factors common to all community college districts that change with time. In ad-
dition to year fixed effects, in some specifications time is also accounted for using
community college-specific linear time trends. However, in the preferred specifica-
tion, community college district-by-time fixed effects, τtc, are included to account
for common trends and shocks that occur to both the treatment and control group
in a community college district.
The rich set of controls and fixed effects in Equation 1.1 enable a compari-
son of enrollment rates within K-12 districts across cohorts who experienced lower
tuition. The K-12 districts who were already part of the taxing district serve as the
comparison group. These controls are in place so that θ captures only the effect
of taxing district annexation after controlling for K-12 district fixed characteristics,
demographic characteristics, time effects, labor market conditions, trends common
to all K-12 districts in the community college district, and new campuses.25
25As an illustrative example of the spirit of the estimator, consider the annexation of Del Valle
Independent School District (ISD). Dell Valle ISD was annexed into the Austin Community College
taxing district in 2004 and will serve as the “treatment group”. After 2004, high school graduates
from Del Valle ISD experienced reduced tuition as a result of annexation into the taxing district.
Austin ISD was part of the Austin Community College taxing district many years prior to the data
and will serve as the “control group” because students in Austin ISD did not experience substantial
changes in tuition. I compare the change in enrollment rates for Del Valle ISD before and after 2004
to changes in enrollment rates for Austin ISD before and after 2004. The difference in these differ-
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Equation 1.1 captures the effect of annexation and the resulting cheaper tu-
ition on student outcomes. However, this does not scale the effects of annexation
by the change in tuition. In order to do this an instrumental variables strategy is
used where listed community college tuition is instrumented for usingAnnexationdt
as in the following first stage equation:
Tuitioncdt = ς · Annexationdt +Xdtφ+Wctχ+ ϑd + δt + ωct + µcdt (1.2)
The second stage equation becomes:
Ycdt = σ · ̂Tuitiondt +Xdtκ+Wctρ+ pid + ζt + λct + υcdt (1.3)
Tuitiondt is the sticker price of community college tuition and fees for two
semesters of 12 credit hours measured in 1,000s of 2012 dollars. Prior to a K-12
district’s annexation Tuitiondt is the out-of-district price and after annexation, it
is the in-district price. The parameter of interest is σ which is the coefficient on
in-district tuition and represents the effect of a $1,000 increase in sticker tuition on
enrollment outcomes. Several outcomes will be considered as Yi including indi-
cators for community college enrollment, enrollment in the in-district community
college, four-year university enrollment, and no enrollment. This will allow an in-
vestigation of not only the own price sensitivity of community college enrollment,
but also the cross price sensitivity for four-year college enrollment.
ences is interpreted as the effect of the reduced tuition resulting from annexation on community
college enrollment. The actual estimation performs this type of exercise for many treatment and
control districts simultaneously while also controlling for many other factors.
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Assumptions for Identification
For the identification strategy used to examine the effect of annexation on
enrollment to be valid, I must assume that treatment and control K-12 districts
have the same trends in college enrollment prior to treatment.26 While this seems
reasonable given that students in these K-12 districts share many common charac-
teristics like geography, labor markets, etc., I will test this in more detail later in
the paper by providing visual evidence.27
Another assumption is that there are no other shocks occurring at the same
time as annexation that would also affect the decision to enroll. To address this is-
sue I control for potential confounders like demographic characteristics, indicators
for new community college campuses in the K-12 district, and use year-by-college
fixed effects to capture shocks common to treatment and control groups. While
there could still be unaccounted for shocks that occur, the shocks would have to be
systematically correlated to annexation across different colleges and districts. It is
worth noting that a shock to the entire community college taxing district would be
experienced by both the treatment and control groups and would not be an issue
except if treatment and control districts reacted to the shock differently.28
26Formally the assumption for identification is that E(icdt|Annexationdt, Xidt,Wtc, γd, ηt, τtc) =
0.
27In addition to visual tests presented later in the paper, I test for parallel trends explicitly in each
case of annexation. In all but two of the annexation events, the trend for the treatment and control
districts are not statistically distinguishable. When excluding these two annexations, the results do
not change substantively.
28One potential confounder would be a change in the admissions policies of community colleges
that coincided with annexation. This is a potential problem in a selective college setting, but be-
cause community colleges are open-enrollment this is not an issue. If community colleges changed
in quality after annexation this increased quality would affect both the treatment and control dis-
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As previously discussed, annexation is always associated with a vote ap-
proving the annexation. The assumption is that timing of a vote authorizing an-
nexation is exogenous or unrelated to factors that may affect community college
enrollment. The timing of votes cannot be related to the underlying characteristics
of students or taxing district which will be tested in Table 2.2.
One way to test that annexation is unrelated to other factors is to exam-
ine whether observable characteristics of a district are related to annexation. If
student observable characteristics are related to annexation, student unobservable
characteristics are likely to be related as well. Table 2.2 presents these results and
finds that annexation is unrelated to gender, race, economic disadvantage status,
and limited English proficiency indicators. I also consider whether annexation is
related to high school graduation by selecting a sample of 10th graders and find
no relationship between annexation and the probability of graduating from high
school in column 9 of Table 2.2.29 Lastly, student plans for college are measured and
are found to be negatively related to annexation though this result is marginally
statistically significant. The implications of no change (or possibly a small negative
change) in college plans will be discussed further in the results section. Overall,
Table 2.2 presents evidence that student characteristics were not observably differ-
tricts.
29I define the annexation variable for these students as cohorts who will experience an annexation
in their senior year rather than in their tenth grade year. A special consideration is that students
may change their graduation plans in response to annexation. Graduation plans would be difficult
for students to change as annexation is announced during a student’s senior year, but I can test for
this directly. The probability of graduation does not change for cohorts that will be annexed. This
means that using the sample of high school graduates does not suffer from the sample selection
related to annexation. Interestingly, students are asked whether they plan to attend college and
this variable does not change. The implications of this finding will be discussed in the Section 1.5.2.
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ent by annexation status. This evidence lends credibility to the assumption that
there were no simultaneous changes at the time of annexation.
In order for the estimates of σ in Equation 3.1 to reveal the effect of commu-
nity college tuition on enrollment several assumptions for instrumental variable
estimation need to hold. The first is that annexation is strongly related to tuition.
Annexation is a policy that intentionally changes the tuition and so this should be
true. Table 1.4 examines the impact of annexation on the sticker price of tuition and
finds that annexation reduces tuition by $1124. This reduction is verified visually
in Panel A of Figure 1.3 where annexation results in a substantial drop in tuition
by approximately 50 percent.
I must also assume that annexation is correlated with community college
tuition but is not related to any other factors that would influence enrollment be-
havior. Ultimately this exclusion restriction is untestable, but controlling for the
factors that are most likely to vary at the county/K-12 district level as previously
outlined helps alleviate potential problems. One change of particular interest may
be the changing of services offered by community colleges which I attempt to cap-
ture using indicators for new campuses being built.
The last required assumption for a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)
interpretation of the instrumental variable estimation is a monotonicity assump-
tion. The LATE interpretation implies that the parameter estimated applies to the
group of students who were induced to attend community college by the instru-
ment. The monotonicity assumption means that annexation cannot induce some
students to enroll in community college and discourage some students who would
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have enrolled in community college from enrolling. In this context this assump-
tion seems very reasonable as a story where less costly community college leads to
decreased community college enrollment is counter-intuitive.
1.5.2 Enrollment Results
Panel A of Table 1.6 contains the reduced form estimates of the effect of
annexation on immediate community college enrollment. Only the preferred spec-
ification is presented which includes year, K-12 district fixed effects, demographic
characteristics, and college by year fixed effects. Results for other specifications are
quantitatively and qualitatively similar and are available upon request.30 Column
1 shows that annexation is associated with a 3.2 pp increase in community college
attendance, which is a 12 percent increase over the sample average. Column 2 in
Panel A of Table 1.6 examines the effect of annexation on enrollment at four-year
universities. In the preferred specification there is a very small point estimate of
-.05 pp that is not statistically significant suggesting no impact of annexation on
public, four-year enrollment.
To test whether the local community college’s price is the relevant price for
community college for most students, I compare the estimated effects of enroll-
ment in any community college in Panel A, column 1 of Table 1.6 to the effects
of in-district enrollment found in Panel A, column 3 of Table 1.6.31 If students
30Other specifications that do not include demographics or college/year fixed effects tend to
measure effects that are slightly larger in absolute value than the results presented.
31For cohorts that were not in district at the time of high school graduation this is defined as the
community college into which their K-12 district would eventually be annexed.
27
could easily switch enrollment between community colleges, annexation might
have zero effect on enrollment in community college but a large increase in enroll-
ment in-district. The estimated annexation effect is larger for enrolling in-district
at 4.4 pp than for enrolling in any community college which is 3.2 pp. The dis-
crepancy in magnitudes indicates annexation induced some students to switch en-
rollment in community college from out-of-district to the community college that
was closest to home. Ultimately this switching should only bias the estimates of
tuition’s effect on community college enrollment downward as it is an indication
that the local community college’s tuition may not be the relevant tuition for a
subset of students.
Column 4 in Panel A of Table 1.6 examines the effect of annexation on the
decision to not enroll in any public college in the data.32 High school graduates
are 3.1 pp less likely to not attend college as a result of annexation–that is, stu-
dents were 3.1 pp more likely to attend college with all of the increase occurring at
community colleges.
Another important result for interpretation is the combination of the esti-
mated enrollment effects and the lack of effects found on stated college intentions
32Students may be switching enrollment from private two-year colleges to public community
colleges. Notably, Cellini (2009) finds that additional funding for public community colleges in-
duces students to switch from proprietary schools to public community colleges. Unfortunately,
data on for private two-year colleges has only recently been collected by the THECB. However, the
THECB estimated that students at private two-year colleges represented just 3 percent of state col-
lege enrollment in 1999 as compared to public community colleges which represented 44 percent
Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (2001). In fact, if all students switched from private
two-year colleges to community colleges that would only account for approximately 60 percent of
the measured effect. For this reason, switching from private two-year colleges is likely to be at most
a small part of the story.
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in Column 9 of Table 2.2. This suggests that several students had planned on going
to college who would not have enrolled except for changes in community college
costs. Lowering tuition costs did not affect college plans but allowed students who
had a stated interest in college attendance to enroll. This result builds on a grow-
ing body of work that suggests interventions in a student’s high school career can
affect student enrollment behavior Castleman and Page (2013).
Taken together, these results indicate that annexation and the reduced tu-
ition associated with annexation resulted in students attending community college
at higher rates. It also appears that lower tuition induces students who would not
have attended any college to attend community college and that cheaper tuition
did not induce students to switch from public four-year colleges to community
colleges.
To scale the results by the changes in sticker tuition, Equation 3.1 is esti-
mated and results are presented in Panel B of Table 1.6, where the effect of com-
munity college tuition is in $1,000s of dollars. A $1,000 increase in the annual
sticker price of tuition decreases community college attendance by 2.8 pp. It also
decreases enrollment in-district by 3.8 pp and increases the fraction of students en-
rolling in no college by 2.8 pp. As there are not large changes in financial aid, the
change in sticker price is likely to reflect the true tuition bill for students who ex-
perienced annexation. However, sticker price is measured with error which needs
to be corrected.
As previously discussed, the results should be scaled by the change in the
fraction of students eligible for in-district tuition which was measured as .55. Us-
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ing this information a decrease of $1,000 in tuition per semester would lead to an
increase in immediate community college enrollment for high school graduates of
5.1 pp. This is slightly higher than estimates of the effect of financial aid on college
attendance. There are at least two possible reasons for a slightly higher estimate.
The first is that the actual change in the costs of college is observed relatively well
in this study, so appropriate adjustments can be made for measurement error. The
second reason is that students on the margin of attending community college may
be more price sensitive than the entire population of potential college goers.
The estimates thus far have been in terms of the enrollment rate to aid com-
parability with prior estimates in the literature. An alternate approach is to esti-
mate equation 3.1 but to use the natural logarithm of Ycdt and Tuitiondt.33 This
specification yields estimates of the elasticity of enrollment with respect to com-
munity college tuition. An elasticity has the benefit of being unitless and allows
comparisons across time and context. Panel C of Table 1.6 contains these elasticity
estimates. Column 1 indicates that a 10 percent increase in community college tu-
ition would lead to a 1.6 percent decrease in community college enrollment, or 2.9
percent if scaled by the change in in-district tuition payment. Column 2 confirms
that an increase in tuition does not affect enrollment at public four-year univer-
sities. Column 3 indicates that the elasticity is higher for in-district enrollment as
previously discussed. Finally, Column 4 indicates that a 10 percent increase in com-
munity college tuition increases the probability that a student is not attending any
college by .98 percent, or 1.8 percent when accounting for payment of in-district
33When using collapsed data, the cells are weighted by the number of high school graduates.
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tuition.
Overall, these results indicate that students respond to a $1,000 decrease
in community college tuition by increasing immediate community college atten-
dance by 5.1 pp, or a 20 percent increase over the baseline. Students do not appear
to switch their enrollment from universities to enroll in community college but in-
stead switch from not enrolling in college to enrolling in community college. This
finding provides evidence that access to community college in the form of cheaper
tuition has a democratizing effect but no diversion effect.
Effects by Cohort Relative to Annexation
To examine the timing of these effects a model is estimated with indicator
variables for cohorts relative to annexation instead of a single annexation indica-
tor in an event study framework.34 This gives a sense of when enrollment patterns
changed and if pre-existing trends are driving the results. The coefficients are plot-
ted in Figure 1.4 along with 95 percent confidence intervals; the omitted category
is for the cohort one year prior to annexation. Prior to annexation, treatment and
control groups appear to have similar trends in community college enrollment as
can be seen by a flat difference in years prior to annexation. Also, in four of the five
years prior to annexation, the 95 percent confidence interval contains zero which
means that in those years, the difference between treatment and control groups
cannot be distinguished from what it was in the year before annexation. If there
34Cohorts beyond five years after annexation are combined into one indicator for five years or
greater. Cohorts six years or greater before annexation are similarly combined.
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were differential trends the levels of the plotted coefficients would exhibit a trend.
Five years before annexation there appears to be a one time deviation from a flat
trend, but in the four years leading up to annexation there does not appear to be
any trend.
There is a jump in the probability of attending community college in the
year of annexation, and by the second cohort after annexation treated districts are
statistically significantly more likely to attend community college attendance rel-
ative to the control districts. The effects are largest after three years and seem to
stabilize in years 3-5 after annexation.35 A similar exercise for enrollment in uni-
versity is performed in Panel B of Figure 1.4 for enrollment in university though
there does not appear to be any change in university enrollment.
Placebo
To provide an alternate measure of the probability of these estimates aris-
ing from chance, I conduct a placebo exercise. Using data from community college
enrollments in 1996 I predicted whether a college ever expanded its taxing district
using the fraction of male students, fraction of Hispanic students, fraction of stu-
dents in technical programs, and the log number of students. The four colleges
that had the highest likelihood of annexation and as such make up the “placebo
data” were Dallas Community College, Tarrant County College, Tyler Junior Col-
lege, and Collin County Community College. These four colleges were mapped to
35The gradual increase in the estimated effects of annexation could happen for a few reasons, but
one potential explanation that is consistent is a salience story where students may not be entirely
aware of the change in community college price but as time passes information is diffused.
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the four colleges that did experience annexations prior to 2006.36 Within matched
colleges, each K-12 district in the placebo data was randomly assigned to a K-12
district in the actual data and was given the annexation dates (if any) of the district
in the actual data. This assignment rule ensures the same number of treated K-
12 districts and timing of simulated annexations as were contained in the original
data.37 Then the reduced form regression of the effect of annexation on commu-
nity college enrollment was performed and the results were stored. This process
was repeated 500 times and the results are visually summarized in Figure 1.5. The
vertical line shows the coefficient estimated in the actual data and the distribution
of the estimates.
In the case of enrollment in community college, there were no placebo re-
gressions in which a larger effect was estimated. This presents strong evidence
that annexation and the attendant decreases in tuition did increase community
college enrollment. In contrast, the estimated effect of annexation on enrollment in
a four-year college was in the 46th percentile of estimates of the placebo exercise.
The estimate of the effect of annexation on enrollment at a four-year college from
Table 1.6 was statistically insignificant, and the placebo exercise confirms that the
enrollment in universities was not affected.
36This was done to make sure that the matched college had a greater or equal number of school
districts that were in the taxing district as the college that actually experienced the expansion. In-
herently this matched schools of roughly similar sizes. Dallas was matched with Lone Star College,
Tarrant County College with Austin Community College, Tyler Junior College with Amarillo Col-
lege, and Collin County Community College with Hill College.
37There are more control K-12 districts in the placebo data than in the original data because
the four placebo community college districts had more K-12 districts than their actually-treated
counterparts.
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Longer Term Enrollment
To this point immediate enrollment in the fall after high school has been the
focus of the estimation. However, enrollment patterns beyond the fall following
high school graduation are interesting as well. When examining year two after
high school, some students who did not experience reduced community college
tuition directly after high school graduation had exposure to lower community
college tuition two years after high school graduation. The more years pass after
high school, the greater the portion of the control group that has some level of
treatment increases so effects in the later years should be attenuated.
Panel A of Table 1.7 examines community college enrollment in the years
after high school. The dependent variable is a binary indicator with unity if the
student enrolled in community college in the 1st, 2nd, etc. calendar year after
their high school graduation. In all years students are more likely to be enrolled in
community college with the largest estimates being in the years directly after high
school. High school graduates are more likely to respond to annexation in the
entire first year as compared to just fall enrollment immediately following gradu-
ation. The estimated effect of annexation on enrollment in the calendar year after
highs school is 4.5 pp as opposed to 3.2 pp when considering fall only. This trans-
lates into a 7.1 pp increase for a $1,000 decrease in community college tuition when
dividing by .55. The magnitude gets smaller over time but is fairly constant at
around a 10 percent increase over the baseline attendance rate in that year. Taken
together these results indicate that reduced tuition induces high school graduates
to attend community college immediately and continues to affect enrollment for
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several years after high school. The effects past the first year can come through
either increased persistence in college or increased first time enrollment at older
ages. Further consideration of longer term attendance is considered in A.1.3 which
examines credit hours attempted.
Panel B of Table 1.7 performs a similar exercise considering enrollment at
a public university in each year since high school. In the first three years after
high school graduation, students do not appear to be more likely to attend a four-
year university if they experience an annexation. However, starting in year four
after high school, the coefficients increase in magnitude and in year six after high
school the increase is statistically significant. Table 1.8 further explores this result
by examining transfer from community colleges to universities. For each year after
high school graduation I define transfer as if a student is enrolled in a university
in the current year and had been enrolled in a community college in a prior year.
In years three to six after high school, students are more likely to be at universities
with prior attendance at community colleges. These results suggest that reduced
tuition for community colleges induces students to initially enroll in community
colleges and eventually attend four-year universities after attending community
colleges.
The evidence on enrollment suggests that reduced community college tu-
ition has a democratization effect and no diversion effect. Reduced community
college tuition induced students who would not have attended college of any type
to enroll in community colleges. This is compelling, quasi-experimental evidence
on the effect of community college access on enrollment, and the results suggest
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that reduced community college tuition increases college attendance but does not
reduce university enrollment.
1.6 Educational Effects of Community College
1.6.1 Identification
Knowing the relationship between community college access and long term
educational outcomes is difficult because students who attend community college
are likely to be unobservably different from students who do not. In order to over-
come this challenge, a source of variation is needed that influences community
college attendance but does not directly influence long term outcomes. For the
second part of my analysis, I use community college taxing district annexations as
an instrument for community college attendance to identify the effects of commu-
nity college attendance on educational attainment. Annexation has been shown to
strongly influence community college attendance and induces students to attend
community college who would not have attended college otherwise.
For this analysis, I am estimating the following first stage equation us-
ing high school graduates from 1994-2005. The familiar indicator for annexation,
Annexationdt is an instrument for attendance at a community college in the first
year after high school AttendCCdt:
AttendCCdt = ς · Annexationdt +Xdtφ+Wctχ+ ϑd + δt + ωct + µcdt (1.4)
The second stage equation becomes:
Ycdt = ℵ · ̂AttendCCdt +Xdtκ+Wctρ+ pid + ζt + λct + υcdt (1.5)
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Ycdt is an education outcome like graduation from a four-year college. The
indices are the same as prior estimating equations with c indexing community
college taxing district, d indexing K-12 school district, and t indexing time. As
before, these specifications include year fixed effects, K-12 district fixed effects, and
community college district by time fixed effects as well as controls for demographic
characteristics.
For this instrumental variables strategy to be valid there are several as-
sumptions that need to be made. First, the instrument must be strongly corre-
lated with attending community college. Section 1.5 established that annexation
is strongly correlated with community college attendance. Second, the instrument
must not be correlated with longer term outcomes like bachelor’s degree receipt
except through community college attendance.38
1.6.2 Educational Attainment Results
Panel A of Table 1.9 explores the effect of annexation on graduation prob-
abilities from community college as well as universities. Column 1 of Panel A
considers graduation from a community college with a degree or certificate and
does not find any effect of annexation on degree or certificate receipt. Column 2 of
38A potential violation of this assumption is if cheaper community college tuition affects students
who would have attended community college anyway by giving them access to reduced tuition. In
order to test this an indicator for the cohort prior to annexation is included. These students would
have access to cheaper community college tuition in all but the first year of attendance. This indica-
tor is statistically insignificant and very small suggesting that access to cheaper community college
for students who would have attended community college in the presence of higher tuition did
not affect graduation probabilities. This result supports the assumption of the exclusion restriction.
The full results from this exercise are available upon request.
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Panel A considers graduation with a community college credential or degree after
4 years and finds no effect. Likewise, annexation is not associated with increases
of bachelors’ degree receipt in 4 or 6 years after high school graduation. However,
for 8 years after high school graduation, there is an increase of 1.1 pp with a p-
value of .11 providing marginally statistically significant evidence that annexation
increased bachelor’s degree receipt after eight years.
Panels C and D of Figure 1.4 consider graduation outcomes by cohort rela-
tive to annexation. In both instances graduation appears to have increased slightly
in the years after annexation but not dramatically so. This confirms the results in
Panel A of Table 1.9 which measured statistically imprecise increases in gradua-
tion as a result of annexation. The previously described placebo exercise is also
performed and summarized in Panel C and D of Figure 1.5. The estimate for grad-
uation from community college in 4 years is in the 10th percentile of estimates
from the placebo exercise, and the estimate for bachelor’s degree receipt in 8 years
is in the 13th percentile. This mirrors the prior finding that attending community
college appears to increase educational attainment.
To consider the effect of attending a community college on ultimate degree
receipt Equation 1.5 is estimated. The results are very similar to what has been dis-
cussed previously but scales the results by the fraction of students who attended a
community college in the first year after high school graduation. The results from
this instrumental variables estimation are in Panel B of Table 1.9 which indicates
that attending community college increases the probability of graduation with a
four-year degree eight years after high school by 23 pp. This result is marginally
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statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that students induced
to attend community college as a result of annexation are more likely to graduate
with a four-year degree. These students would not have attended college other-
wise, and so the decreased tuition provided a viable pathway toward bachelor’s
degree receipt.
1.7 Heterogeneity
This section examines the heterogeneous effects of reduced community col-
lege tuition on enrollment in addition to the heterogeneous effects of community
college attendance on educational attainment by race, gender, and economic dis-
advantage status. Table 1.10 contains estimates for the enrollment effects as well
as the reduced-form effects for educational attainment. In these analyses, I employ
a fully interacted model where indicators for race, gender, or economic disadvan-
tage status are interacted with every variable in Equation 1.1.
I will only discuss the results that have statistically different results by gen-
der, economic disadvantage, or race while all others are statistically indistinguish-
able. For immediate enrollment in community college, African American students
respond more strongly to annexation than white students. African American stu-
dents also respond to annexation by diverting enrollment from universities to com-
munity college.
The measured diversion effect for African American students stands in con-
trast to the results for the whole sample where there was no switching from uni-
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versities to community colleges. Interestingly, white students are more likely to
receive a bachelor’s degree in eight years and African American students are are
not statistically any different in their bachelor’s degree receipt despite being ini-
tially diverted from universities–in fact, the point estimate is positive. This sug-
gests that for these racial groups that community colleges have a democratization
effect, even for students induced to attend community college who would have
attended universities.
Exploring the heterogeneous effects suggests that minority students are par-
ticularly price sensitive in their community college enrollment decision. Addition-
ally, the results present another piece of evidence that community colleges increase
overall educational attainment because students induced to attend community col-
lege at higher rates due to lowered tuition have higher probability of bachelor’s de-
gree receipt. These results also suggest that reduced community college tuition is
likely to affect minority students to a greater degree and that the long term effects
for minority students do not differ from white students.
The evidence in this paper finds support for a democratization effect but
no support for a diversion effect of attending community colleges. This may be
because the groups induced to attend community college persist at higher rates
due to lower costs or a better match of an the student’s needs and institutional
structures. The results suggesting that bachelor’s degree receipt increases even for
groups of students initially diverted to community college run counter to the find-
ings of Goodman et al. (2014). There are several reasons that these findings may
be different–the first is considering the local average treatment effect in both cases.
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In the present study the affected population are students who respond to price as
compared to students who are constrained by low SAT scores. These groups of
students need not be the same or share the same response to community college
attendance. Also, students who elect to attend community college instead of a
four-year university when community college tuition is decreased may respond
differently to community college attendance than students who are excluded from
university enrollment on academic grounds.39 Additionally, the results in this pa-
per find evidence in support of a democratization effect of community college for
racial minorities.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence on the price sensitivity of community college
enrollment as well as the long term consequences of community college enroll-
ment. Using variation in the price of tuition at community colleges in Texas caused
by the expansion of community college taxing districts and administrative data, I
find that students respond to changes in community college tuition at a higher rate
than the rate at which prior studies have measured responses to grant aid. Overall,
students do not switch from four-year college to community college as a result of
price decreases but rather switch to attending from not enrolling in college. How-
ever, there is important heterogeneity by race in the response to reduced com-
munity college tuition with racial minorities initially diverting attendance from
39The differing educational contexts in Georgia versus Texas may also matter.
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universities to community colleges.
For students induced to attend community college, educational attainment
is increased as measured by bachelor’s degree receipt and credits attempted. In-
creased educational attainment occurs for students who switch to community col-
lege attendance from both not enrolling in college as well as from attending a uni-
versity. This paper provides quasi-experimental evidence on the democratization
versus diversion effect of community college and finds evidence supporting a de-
mocratization effect for community college.
The Texas experience studied provides insight into the potential effects of
reduced community college tuition on the enrollment and educational attainment
of proposals that would reduce community college tuition. A $1,000 in commu-
nity college tuition leads to larger increases in attendance than the same increase
in financial aid primarily used at four year universities. Increasing the number
of students who attend community college also increases the number of students
earning bachelor’s degrees. These findings help frame discussions about the mer-
its of proposals to reduce community college tuition.
Overall, lowering community college costs provides a pathway for more
students to attend college. It also has positive, longer term benefits of bachelor’s
degree receipt. The benefits of community college attendance may make lower-
ing community college tuition an attractive option for policymakers seeking to
increase educational attainment.
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1.9 Tables and Figures
1.9.1 Figures
Figure 1.1: Texas Community College Taxing Districts
Source: Texas Association of Community Colleges, 2008. This figure highlights the
areas in Texas included in a community college taxing district in 2008.
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Figure 1.2: Texas Community College Expansions
Each panel represents the taxing district of a distinct community college in Texas.
The boundaries in the figures represent K-12 school district boundaries and the
colors indicate when the K-12 district was annexed. K-12 districts that have no
color were included in the community college taxing district prior to the start of
the data.
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Figure 1.3: Change In Cost
(a) In-District Status (b) Tuition
Panel A plots the fraction of students in a K-12 cohort paying in-district tuition at
the local community college among students who attended community college.
Each dot represents a cohort re-centered by its annexation date. The size of the
dot is proportional to the number of students attending community college in that
re-centered year. Only K-12 districts that experience an annexation are included
in this figure.
Panel B is a plot of the tuition and fees for two semesters of 12 credits paid by stu-
dent at the local community college relative to annexation. For comparability, only
schools that had five years prior to annexation and five years after were included.
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Figure 1.4: Event Studies for Annexation
(a) CC Enrollment (b) 4yr Enrollment
(c) Grad CC, 4 yrs (d) Grad 4yr, 8 yrs
These figure plots the coefficients of a regression that compares yearly differences
in student outcomes between annexed districts and districts already part of the tax-
ing district. Panel A considers immediate enrollment in community college, Panel
B considers immediate enrollment at a university, Panel C examines receiving a
degree or certificate from a community college in 4 years, and Panel D examines
receiving a bachelor’s degree within 4 years. The regression that produces these
differences also controls for demographic characteristics, year fixed effects, K-12
district fixed effects, college-by-year fixed effects, as well as the building of a new
campus.
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Figure 1.5: Placebo Regressions
(a) CC Enrollment (b) 4yr Enrollment
(c) Grad CC, 4 yrs (d) Grad 4yr, 8 yrs
The above figures represent the results of a placebo test describe in Section 1.5.2
for various student outcomes. Panel A examines enrollment in community col-
lege, panel B examines enrollment in universities, panel C examines graduation
from community college within 4 years, and panel D examines bachelor’s degree
receipt within 8 years. The plots display the distribution of estimated treatment
effects using data from other community college districts that did not experience
annexation. The vertical line represents the treatment effect measured in the actual
data.
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1.9.2 Tables
Table 1.1: Expansions of Community College Taxing Districts
Austin Community College
District Expansion of Taxing District New Building
Manor ISD 1999 1999
Del Valle ISD 2004
Round Rock ISD 2008 2010
Elgin ISD 2011 2013
Hays ISD 2011 2014
Lone Star College
District Expansion of Taxing District New Building
Conroe 1991 1995
Willis 1996
Splendora 1996
Klein 1998 2011
Cypress-Fairbanks 2000 2003
Magnolia 2000
Amarillo College
District Expansion of Taxing District New Building
Hereford 2005 2005
Dumas 1999 2001
Hill College
District Expansion of Taxing District New Building
Rio Vista 1999 2000
Keene 2000 2000
Joshua 1998 2000
Grandview 1998 2000
Godley 1999 2000
Cleburn 1998 2000
Alvarado 1999 2000
Houston Community College
District Expansion of Taxing District New Building
Alief 2009 2008
North Forest 2010
This table outlines the expansions to the five community colleges that experience
annexations of municipalities into taxing districts during the time contained in the
data. Each row contains a K-12 District, the year of annexation and the year of
building a new campus (if any). See Appendix A.1.1 for details on the collection of
these dates.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Mean SD N
Enrolled in CC, Fall 0.265 0.441 206375
Enrolled in 4yr, Fall 0.247 0.431 206375
Enrolled In-District, Fall 0.211 0.408 206375
Enrolled in CC, 1 Year after HS 0.384 0.486 206375
Enrolled in 4yr, 1 Year after HS 0.232 0.422 206375
Pays In District Tuition 0.715 0.452 54658
Ever Annexed 0.391 0.488 206375
Post Annexation 0.250 0.433 206375
Building 0.180 0.384 206375
Did not Enroll 0.491 0.500 206375
Grad with 4yr Degree in 4 Years 0.077 0.266 206375
Grad with 4yr Degree in 6 Years 0.212 0.409 206375
Grad with 2yr Degree in 2 Years 0.011 0.106 206375
Grad with 2yr Degree in 4 Years 0.041 0.199 206375
Asian 0.043 0.203 206375
Black 0.112 0.315 206375
Hispanic 0.192 0.394 206375
White 0.651 0.477 206375
Male 0.512 0.500 206375
Economically Disadvantaged 0.152 0.359 206375
Limited English Proficiency 0.013 0.112 206375
Sticker Tuition 1266.2 390.7 206375
Grants 213.9 939.7 120580
This table is constructed using ERC and Texas Association of Community College
data and includes students from 1994-2005 who live K-12 Districts that are part
of community college taxing districts that experience any annexation from 1994-
2005. This includes Austin Community College, Amarillo Community College,
Hill Community College, and Lone Star Community College.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics, Before and After Annexation
Pre Post
Mean N Mean N
Enrolled in CC 0.230 29032 0.278 51680
Enrolled in 4yr 0.279 29032 0.279 51680
Enrolled In-District 0.143 29032 0.206 51680
Did not Enroll 0.493 29032 0.448 51680
Theoretical Tuition 1.962 29032 1.160 51680
Pays In District Tuition 0.109 6664 0.724 14390
Building 0.000 29032 0.359 51680
Grad with 4yr Degree in 4 Years 0.075 29032 0.095 51680
Grad with 4yr Degree in 6 Years 0.227 29032 0.245 51680
Grad with 2yr Degree in 2 Years 0.007 29032 0.013 51680
Grad with 2yr Degree in 4 Years 0.024 29032 0.050 51680
This table is constructed using ERC and Texas Association of Community College
data and includes students from 1994-2005 living in K-12 districts that
experienced annexation. The data are split before and after annexation. This
includes Austin Community College, Amarillo Community College, Hill
Community College, and Lone Star Community College.
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Table 1.4: Changes in Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CC Tuition In District Grants Grants, No Zero
Annexation -1.124*** 0.55*** -173.1 -286.8***
(0.0627) (0.021) (125.0) (80.2)
Mean of Dep Var 1.266 0.71 322.3 3593.5
N, Students 206,375 206,375 274,739 24,639
Year and District FE X X X X
Demographics X X X X
College/Year FE X X X X
This table considers the changes in cost associated with annexation. CC tuition
is the amount paid in tuition for two, 12 credit hour semesters in $1000s of 2012
dollars. In District is an indicator for whether a student pays in district tuition
among community college attendees. For both tuition and in-district status, high
school graduates from 1994-2005 are considered. Grants consider the amount of
grants received at community colleges for high school graduates from 2001-2012.
The rows at the bottom indicate inclusion of controls for year and district fixed
effects, demographic characteristics including race and gender, and college by year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the K-12 district level and are in
parentheses with ∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 1.5: Student Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Asian Black Hispanic White Male Econ. Limited College Grad
Disadv. Engl. Plans HS
Annexation 0.0029 -0.0057 -0.010 0.013 -0.0022 -0.036 -0.0031 -0.041* -0.00844
(0.0032) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.0043) (0.027) (0.0023) (0.022) (0.0141)
Year and District FE X X X X X X X X X
College/Year FE X X X X X X X X X
New Campuses X X X X X X X X X
Mean of Dep Var 0.043 0.11 0.19 0.65 0.51 0.15 0.013 0.77 0.705
N 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370 232689
This table considers how student characteristics vary with annexation. Results in
columns 1 to 8 use high school graduates from 1994-2005. Column 9 examines
graduation behavior for cohorts that will be annexed in the future by examining
10th graders from the 1996-2005 graduating classes. The columns at the bottom
indicate inclusion of controls for year and district fixed effects, demographic
characteristics including race and gender, college by year fixed effects, and an
indicators for new campuses. Standard errors are clustered at the K-12 district
level are in parentheses with ∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 1.6: Immediate Enrollment Effects
A. Reduced Form
Immediate Enrollment CC 4yr In. Dist Nowhere
Annexation 0.032*** -0.00057 0.044*** -0.031***
(0.0059) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0086)
Mean of Dep Var 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.49
N 206370 206370 206370 206370
B. Per $1000 Dollars
Immediate Enrollment CC 4yr In. Dist Nowhere
Annexation -0.028*** 0.00050 -0.039*** 0.028***
(0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0046)
Mean of Dep Var 0.26 0.25 0.49 0.21
N 206370 206370 206370 206370
C. Elasticity Log Log Log Log
Immediate Enrollment CC 4yr In Dist. None
Log Tuition -0.16*** 0.0016 -0.36*** 0.097***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.066) (0.021)
N 372 372 372 372
Year and District FE X X X X
Demographics X X X X
College/Year FE X X X X
New Campuses X X X X
This table considers enrollment in the fall immediately after high school gradua-
tion. Panel A considers the reduced form effect of annexation on enrollment and
Panel B instruments for changes in tuition with annexation. Standard errors are
clustered at the K-12 district level are in parentheses with ∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p <
.01. Panel C collapses the data into K-12 District/Year cells and considers log out-
comes and log tuition with tuition instrumented for using annexation.
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Table 1.7: Enrollment in CC by Years after HS Graduation
A. Enrollment in CC (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years
Annexation 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.0095*** 0.0087**
(0.0084) (0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0035)
Mean of Dep Var 0.38 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.089
N 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370
A. Enrollment in 4yr 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years
Annexation -0.00036 0.00038 0.0038 0.0089 0.0044 0.0070***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0096) (0.0037) (0.0025)
Mean of Dep Var 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.12 0.089
N 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370
Year and District FE X X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X X
College/Year FE X X X X X X
New Campuses X X X X X X
This table considers longer term enrollment patterns of annexation. Each column
is a separate regression containing an indicator for if a student enrolled in the Xth
year after high school graduation. For year 1, this would be if a student enrolls in
the Fall, Spring, or Summer semester immediate after their high school
graduation. The rows at the bottom indicate inclusion of controls for year and
district fixed effects, demographic characteristics including race and gender,
college by year fixed effects, and indicators for new campuses. All results use
high school graduates from 1994-2005. Standard errors are clustered at the K-12
district level and are in parentheses with ∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 1.8: Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transfer Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Annexation 0.011 0.014∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0073) (0.0056) (0.0021) (0.0018)
Year and District FE X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X
College/Year FE X X X X X
New Campuses X X X X X
Mean of Dep Var 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.097 0.071
N 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370
This table considers student transfer behavior. Transfer is defined as attending a
university in the Xth year when having attended a community college in a prior
year. The rows at the bottom indicate inclusion of controls for year and district
fixed effects, demographic characteristics including race and gender, college by
year fixed effects, and indicators for new campuses. All results use high school
graduates from 1994-2005. Standard errors are clustered at the K-12 district level
and are in parentheses with ∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 1.9: Community College Effect on Educational Attainment
A. Reduced Form (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Grad CC Grad CC Grad 4yr Grad 4yr Grad 4yr
in 2 yrs in 4 yrs in 4yrs in 6yrs in 8yrs
Annexation -0.0023 0.00331 0.0015 0.0061 0.011
(0.0015) (0.00287) (0.0040) (0.0075) (0.0070)
B. Instrumental Variables Grad CC Grad CC Grad 4yr Grad 4yr Grad 4yr
in 2 yrs in 4 yrs in 4yrs in 6yrs in 8yrs
Attend CC -0.048 0.070 0.032 0.13 0.23*
(0.029) (0.061) (0.079) (0.14) (0.12)
Year and District FE X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X
College/Year FE X X X X X
New Campuses X X X X X
Mean of Dep Var 0.011 0.041 0.077 0.21 0.25
N 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370
This table considers the effect of community college attendance on educational
attainment from 1994-2005. Panel A considers the reduced form effect of
annexation on graduation outcomes and Panel B instruments for community
college attendance within the first year after high school graduation using an
indicator for annexation. The rows at the bottom indicate inclusion of controls for
year and district fixed effects, new campuses, demographic characteristics
including race and gender, and college by year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the K-12 district level and are in parentheses with
∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneous effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enroll CC Enroll 4yr Enroll Grad CC in Grad 4yr
Nowhere 4 years in 8 years
A. Econ. Dis.
Annexation 0.031*** 0.0072 -0.037*** 0.0027 0.012
(0.0079) (0.010) (0.11) (0.0029) (0.0094)
Annexation*Econ Dis. 0.019 -0.035 0.016 0.00013 -0.0096
(0.027) (0.022) (0.023) (0.010) (0.014)
B. Race
Annexation 0.027*** 0.014 -0.040*** 0.00053 0.015*
(0.0069) (0.010) (0.011) (0.0032) (0.0083)
Annexation*Black 0.024** -0.044*** 0.020* 0.0084** 0.0080
(0.0090) (0.0083) (0.010) (0.0040) (0.0068)
Annexation*Hispanic 0.015 -0.018 .00049 0.0051 -0.0093
(0.019) (0.013) (.015) (0.0055) (0.0061)
C. Gender
0.029*** 0.0087 -.037*** -0.00044 0.014*
Annexation (0.010) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0030) (0.0072)
0.0099 -0.0080 -0.0014 0.0078*** 0.00017
Annexation*Male (0.0096) (0.0085) (0.013) (0.0025) (0.0067)
Mean of Dep Var 0.26 0.25 .049 0.041 0.25
N 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370
Year and District FE X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X
College/Year FE X X X X X
New Campuses X X X X X
Table 1.10: (cont.)
This table considers the effect of annexation separately by different student char-
acteristics. Each column represents a new outcome. Panel A contains results that
fully interact the model with indicators fully for economic disadvantage. Panel B
contains results that fully interact the model with indicators fully for race. Panel C
contains results that fully interact the model with indicators for gender.
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Chapter 2
Was That SMART? Institutional Financial Incentives
and Field of Study
With Patrick Turley, Harvard University
2.1 Introduction
Choosing a college major is perhaps the most important decision students
make in their college years, potentially influencing the jobs they are offered, their
future earnings, and their contribution to society. Due to the perception that choice
of major can have long-term impacts, both individually and collectively, policy-
makers have proposed several policies to influence this choice. Many policymak-
ers and researchers have paid particular attention to science, technology, engineer-
ing, and mathematics (STEM) fields due to their high income potential and societal
externalities. In this paper, we explore how students choose their major by investi-
gating whether students respond to direct financial incentives when choosing their
major. We do so by examining the National Science and Mathematics Access to
Retain Talent (SMART) Grant, which offered financial awards to eligible students
who majored in qualified technical fields.
Often, schooling is discussed as homogeneous when the type of training re-
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ceived can be quite heterogeneous. We explore how students choose among many
types of human capital when making decisions about college major. Typically,
economists have modeled choice among heterogeneous types of human capital
(like college major) as agents weighing the costs and benefits of potential options.
However, there may be other factors that matter like the how the major is struc-
tured, the composition of potential peers, or behavioral factors. Our study shows
that small changes in the relative prices of different types of human capital can
have relatively large effects on human capital acquisition.1 Our work also sug-
gests suggests that simple financial incentives can alter the skill composition of the
work force.
On an individual level, there is evidence that college major can have sig-
nificant labor market impacts. (Arcidiacono, 2004; Arcidiacono et al., 2012). For
instance, in the 2009 and 2010 American Community Survey, college graduates
with fine art degrees had an unemployment rate of 11.1% and an average salary of
about $30,000; college graduates with engineering degrees had an unemployment
rate of 7.5% and an average salary of about $55,000 (Carnevale et al., 2012). How-
ever, differences in labor market outcomes cannot be solely attributed to different
returns to college majors due to selection into majors and subsequent selection
into the labor force.2 It is interesting to note, however, that with or without a de-
gree in a STEM field, acquiring technical skills (e.g taking more math courses in
1The changes in incentives examined in this study are much smaller than average differences in
earnings across these fields.
2Hamermesh and Donald (2008) find that the earnings gap across majors decreases when con-
trolling for hours worked and selection into the labor force.
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high school) may lead to a wage premium of as high as 20-25 percent (Joensen
and Nielsen, 2009). While there appear to be private benefits to majoring in STEM
fields, there is also evidence of externalities, suggesting a justification for policy
intervention.3
The US Department of Education operated the SMART Grant program be-
tween the fall of 2006 and the summer of 2011 in an effort to direct college stu-
dents into–and retain them in–certain fields. In particular, this program gave up
to $8,000 to juniors and seniors who met a variety of criteria including majoring
in technical fields or critical foreign languages, qualifying for Pell Grants (a fed-
eral needs-based grant program for college students), and having a GPA above
3.0. This program awarded $195 million in grants in the 2006-2007 school year
(United States Department of Education, 2007) and over $432 million in grants for
the 2010-2011 school year (Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011).
This paper investigates the effect of the SMART Grant program using student-
level, administrative data from all public universities in Texas and from Brigham
Young University (BYU), a large private university in Utah that received the largest
amount of SMART Grants of any school in the nation in the first year of the pro-
gram. By examining this program we hope to gain important insights into how
students choose their major and the role that policy can play in the types of hu-
3For instance, Murphy et al. (1991) show that the economy of countries with a higher fraction of
engineering majors grows more quickly than the economy of countries with more law concentra-
tors. The choice of major is a significant source of interest for the Federal Government of the United
States. In fact, the U.S. government has claimed, “In the case of technical fields, these majors will
benefit both national and individual competitiveness, increasing the nation’s economic security.”
(United States Department of Education, 2006).
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man capital acquired. Our research design takes advantage of a discontinuity in
the Pell Grant eligibility criteria and uses a regression discontinuity design to un-
cover the causal impact of the program on various measures of student major. Our
data include students who attended these schools from the year 2000-01 to 2011-
12, which allows us to conduct a robustness test of this discontinuity in the years
before the grant existed as well as for one year after the grant ended. Our results
show that SMART Grants did induce students to major in STEM fields as juniors
and seniors who would not have done so otherwise. We also provide suggestive
evidence that this response operates more strongly through encouraging students
already in SMART-eligible majors to persist their major than through pushing stu-
dent in non-eligible majors to switch into an eligible field. The overall estimated
effect is over twice as large at BYU as at public universities in Texas. Our results
suggest that programs can have very different results in different settings and over
time. We explore these differences and find that the differences are consistent with
salience being an important determinant of the effect of a program.
It may seem surprising that students could react to incentives that are small
relative to the average wage differentials between these fields. However, large
effects may exist if students are myopic, misinformed about future earnings, or
credit-constrained. Credit constraints may be particularly relevant in the case of
SMART Grants since the grant was only available to low-income students. The
responsiveness to relatively small amounts of financial incentives suggests that
behavioral factors or market failures are likely to play a significant role in the ac-
quisition of human capital.
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Our work is part of a large literature on how students choose their college
major. Previous research has identified many factors that appear to play a role in
this choice, including tastes and ability (Wiswall and Zafar, 2011; Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner, 2011), career risk (Saks and Shore, 2005), future earnings (Berger,
1988; Wiswall and Zafar, 2011; Beffy et al., 2012), credit constraints (Rothstein and
Rouse, 2011), career opportunities (Eide and Waehrer, 1998), differential tuition
(Stange, 2015), and financial aid (Evans, 2012; Sjoquist and Winters, ming).4 Our
paper contributes to this literature by providing the strongest evidence to date that
even small direct financial incentives can have large impacts on a student’s major.
Of the above papers, only two consider how direct financial incentives may
motivate students to graduate in targeted fields. Stange (2015) uses university-
level data to perform a difference-in-difference analysis of the roll-out of differ-
ential tuition programs across the country. He finds that increasing the tuition of
particular majors decreased the number of students graduating in some fields, but
increased it in others. He explains that the increase is likely because he is unable
to decompose this effect into a response due to a price change and a change in the
quality or capacity of departments who expand with the additional tuition money.
4Many studies have found that merit-based financial aid programs have increased college en-
rollment (Kane, 2003; Dynarski, 2004; Cornwell et al., 2005), decreased college dropout rates (Dy-
narski, 2008), and raised GPAs (Scott-Clayton, 2011). However, the evidence on how these pro-
grams impact course taking is mixed, with papers that report that merit-based aid programs in-
crease, decrease, and have no effect on course credit accumulation (Scott-Clayton, 2011; Brock and
Richburg-Hayes, 2006; Angrist et al., 2009; Cornwell et al., 2005). Turner (2014) illustrates that grant
aid can be captured by the institution rather than fully realized by the student. Turner finds that
11% of Pell aid is captured by universities though the estimate is smaller at 4.9% for public uni-
versities. We proceed with our analysis noting that some of the aid disbursed may be captured by
universities but that that amount is likely to be small.
63
In contrast, we use individual-level data, which allows us to compare students
within the same institution who qualify for direct financial incentives to those who
do not.
Concurrent with our study, a working paper by Evans (2012) considers the
impact of SMART Grants at Ohio pubic universities and finds little evidence sug-
gesting that the SMART Grant program increased the number of students grad-
uating in STEM fields. There are several key differences in our paper which will
be discussed in detail later in the paper. However, he is limited in that he only
has data from 2006 to 2010. He finds little evidence suggesting that the SMART
Grant program increased the number of students graduating in STEM fields. We
attribute the difference in our results to a variety of factors. Importantly, we have
access to more years of data, we use a different method of sample selection, and we
have a more diverse sample of universities. In the National Postsecondary Student
Aid Survey administered in 2008, there is evidence that there is little knowledge
of the program nationally, which means it should be unsurprising that no impact
can be measured in early years. When we replicate Evans’ methodology and data
restrictions but using our data, we similarly find no significant impact of SMART
Grants on students’ choice of major.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives details of the
SMART Grant program. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 discusses the
econometric identification. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 The SMART Grant Program
The U.S. Federal Government operated the SMART grant program from the
fall of 2006 until the summer of 2011 with the purpose of increasing the number
of students who were studying STEM fields and critical languages. This federal
program was designed to complement the existing Pell Grant program. Students
who were eligible for the Grant received up to $2,000 per semester in their junior
and senior year for a maximum benefit of $8,0005. In order to be eligible for a
SMART Grant a student was required to:
• be a U.S. citizen;
• be Pell Grant-eligible during the award semester;
• be majoring in physical, life or computer science, engineering, mathematics,
technology, or critical foreign language fields–hereafter “SMART fields” or
“SMART majors;”6
• be a junior or senior (or fifth year student in a five year program) as defined
by credit hours;
• be enrolled as a full time student;7
5The award amount could not exceed the cost of attendance less Pell Grant receipts
6In practice, this was all foreign language majors in the later years. We use the definitions from
2011 to define which majors are SMART eligible.
7Starting in 2009 a pro-rated award was available to students who were enrolled in at least 6
credits.
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• have at least a 3.0 GPA on a 4.0 scale; 8
To be Pell-eligible a student must submit a Free Application for Federal Student
Aid (FAFSA). The FAFSA is used to compute an Expected Family Contribution
(EFC) which is a score that represents how much a student’s family can afford to
contribute to the student’s post-secondary education. This EFC determines what
federal grant and loan programs a student is eligible for. The threshold that de-
fined whether a student was eligible for Pell Grants increased gradually through-
out the time frame of this study. In the 2006-2007 school year the EFC cutoff for
Pell Grants was 4,110 and by 2010-2011 the EFC cutoff for Pell grants had risen to
5,273.
Students with an EFC below the Pell Grant threshold in a particular year re-
ceived the full amount of the SMART Grant in that year, while any student above
the threshold received no SMART Grant money that year.9 As a result, students
local to the threshold were very similar in family income, but they may have dif-
fered in their incentives to major in eligible fields by up to $4,000 per year10. Our
identification strategy will take advantage of this large discontinuity in incentives.
An additional issue that also may affect the efficacy of the SMART Grant
program is how informed students were about the existence of the grant. Bettinger
8Officially this was 3.0 for course work required for the major. In practice, some school websites
listed the requirement as 3.0 cumulative GPA .
9Provided they were not already receiving other sources of aid that was not greater than the
Cost of Attendance. In practice nearly all students received the full amount of the SMART Grant
for a given semester.
10EFC is computed yearly and so an eligible junior in fall semester would receive $4,000 more
than an ineligible student.
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et al. (2012) highlight how the salience and simplicity of federal grant and schol-
arship programs can have first-order impacts on program take-up. According to
the National Post Secondary Aid Survey, only 6.8% of Pell recipients in 2007-2008
knew about the SMART Grant program. Of the relatively few students who had
heard of the program and were declared in SMART majors, 4.7% said SMART
Grants had affected their choice of major. Of those who had heard of SMART
Grants and who were undeclared, 19.1% said that the grants would “definitely or
probably affect their choice of major. Of the students who were declared in non
SMART majors and had heard of SMART Grants, 16.8% said they would “defi-
nitely or probably 11. This survey suggests that among students who knew about
them, SMART Grants had the potential of influencing choice of major, but given
that so few students knew of the programs existence by 2007-2008, the measured
impact of SMART Grants may be small or undetectable in its early years, which
is consistent with what is seen in the data. One reason that the program may not
have been well known is that students did not have to file additional forms when
applying for the SMART Grant beyond the FAFSA. Rather, the SMART Grant was
automatically added on to financial aid packages if the student was eligible.
2.3 Data
The data come from two administrative data sets. The first data set was
assembled for the purposes of this study by the Texas Higher Education Coordi-
11These statistics from the NPSAS are the authors’ calculations.
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nating Board (THECB). The Texas data contain information on every student who
enrolled in Texas public universities from 2000-2001 to 2011-2012, providing a di-
verse set of public institutions and a large number of students enrolled in higher
education. The data include Expected Family Contribution (EFC) from every stu-
dent who submitted a FAFSA and subsequently enrolled. It also includes infor-
mation on a student’s declared major in every semester they enrolled, degrees re-
ceived, parent’s education, student race, student full time/part time status, cost of
attendance, Texas residency and student gender12. For this study we consider only
students who are attending full time because SMART Grants were available only
to full time students for the majority of the life of the grant. We also restrict the
sample to students for whom the cost of attendance was high enough to enable the
maximum Pell Grant in a given year.13
The second data set includes very similar information for Brigham Young
University starting in 2001-2002. The biggest difference in the BYU data set is ad-
ditional information about classes taken for all students at BYU. The BYU data also
includes additional demographic variables, namely ACT/SAT Score, and the high
school rank of a student (which we express as a percentile) and lacks information
about parental education. Unfortunately ACT/SAT score and class rank variables
are not available for every student, but we only use them as covariates in our re-
gression specification. Our results are robust to specifications that do and do not
12Administrators at THECB feel most confident about the accuracy of the financial aid data start-
ing in 2005. The only substantive variable we use from before that time is EFC, and it appears to
follow similar patterns to the data from post 2005 so we feel confident using these data.
13This restriction does not affect many students but simplifies the calculation of the cutoff for
SMART Grants.
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include these variables.14
Summary statistics for Texas students with an EFC within 2,000 units of the
eligibility threshold are presented in Table 2.1; a similar table for BYU is also pre-
sented in Table 2.1 but with a window of 3,000; these windows roughly correspond
to the largest window chosen when estimating with the respective data sets. The
Texas sample from 2006-07 to 2010-11 is majority female and 30% Hispanic. Many
students in Texas have parents who did not attend college. At public universi-
ties in Texas, 19.2% of juniors are declared in SMART eligible majors. Less than
one percent of these are declared in language majors; the majority being in STEM
majors.
For BYU, the summary statistics reveal that the student body in this EFC
window is 52% male and predominantly white. The fraction of students with
SMART eligible majors in their junior year is higher than the fraction for schools in
Texas as well with 27% of students declared in eligible majors, with a small fraction
in language. This is much larger than the fraction of students in SMART eligible
major in Texas schools in this period. We note though that before 2006, the fraction
of SMART majors at BYU is more similar to schools in Texas at about 22%. The
divergence between Texas and BYU in the years following the grant’s implemen-
tation is consistent with the results found in our analysis, which find much larger
effects of the grant at BYU than in Texas.
14We use a mean value imputation when high school percentile or ACT score is missing along
with a dummy variable for a missing observation, this mean value imputation does not change the
results significantly.
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BYU is unique in that it distributed more SMART Grants than any school in
the nation in the first year of the program. (McArdle et al., 2007) In fact, 4.17% of
students at BYU in our data received a SMART Grant in 2006-2007. By the end of
the program in 2010-2011 6.2% of the student body were receiving SMART Grants.
The reason for this large number of SMART Grant recipients is likely because BYU
has a very high fraction of students receiving Pell Grants. Over 30% of BYU’s
student body received Pell Grants in 2001 which is one of the highest proportions
of Pell recipients among comparable institutions in the nation. (Heller, 2004)
While BYU’s position as the top distributor of SMART Grants may give
cause to question the external validity of any estimates using data from BYU, it
may still provide insights of the impact of these grants in a population that was
likely to be aware of the grant. During this time frame around 5% of all BYU stu-
dents were receiving SMART Grants, which means that many students were likely
to have heard about the program through informal channels. In fact, some majors
at BYU publicly advertised at orientation meetings that choosing their major could
result in up to an additional $8,000 in grants. Public universities in Texas, however,
seem to resemble more closely national patterns for the fraction of students receiv-
ing SMART Grants. In the Texas data there were 2,808 SMART Grants awarded in
the 2006-07 school year, and 6,496 were awarded in 2010-11 .15
15Some of this increase is likely due to relaxing the requirements for the grant, but some is also
likely to represent real growth in SMART Grants distributed.
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2.4 Identification
2.4.1 Background
When a student completes the FAFSA, their EFC is computed from informa-
tion about family income, assets, and number of dependent children in a student’s
family. This EFC determines eligibility for a host of federal grant and loan pro-
grams like Pell Grants, SMART Grants, subsidized student loans, etc. Each year
a minimum Pell Grant and an EFC threshold are set. If a student’s EFC is below
the EFC threshold, then the amount of a student’s Pell Grant will be equal to a de-
creasing function in EFC that equals the minimum Pell Grant at the threshold and
is zero for all values above the threshold.16 This means that if the student’s EFC
is above the EFC threshold, no Pell Grant is received. Although the amount of a
student’s Pell Grant is a function of their EFC, students receive the whole SMART
Grant if their EFC is below the threshold that qualifies them for a Pell Grant of
any size. Thus, this discrete cutoff in Pell eligibility serves as a discrete cutoff in
SMART Grant eligibility and facilitates a fuzzy regression discontinuity design.
The identification comes from the fact that students barely on one side of the Pell
eligibility cutoff are similar to students on the other side in both observable and un-
observable ways, but they differ in their eligibility for SMART Grants. Estimates
for the impact of the program are all local to the margin of eligibility; namely, stu-
dents with families who are just barely eligible. Roughly, these are students with
family incomes from $40,000 to $60,000 in 2010 dollars (Office of Postsecondary
16This function is a step function. In general, the function takes on the minimum Pell amount for
a few hundred EFC units below the EFC threshold, though this varies from year to year.
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Education, 2011).
Since the threshold for eligibility for SMART Grants is the same as the
threshold for Pell Grant eligibility, using this threshold may conflate the effect of
SMART Grants and the effect of Pell Grants. We address this by performing the
same analysis on the Pell Grant eligibility threshold in the years before SMART
Grants were implemented and find that Pell Grant eligibility had no impact on the
outcomes of interest in those years. We also perform the analysis for the one year
in the data after the grant program ended and again find no effect. The likely rea-
son for this null finding is that the Pell Grant for this marginal group was only $400
per year in 2006 and grew to $976 per year in 2010. This amount is small relative to
SMART Grants, which paid $4,000 per year.17 Additionally, the Pell grant offers no
price incentives for major and would be operating through an income effect which
is less likely to affect SMART major participation. Additionally, we will later show
that the largest responses measured were not in years with the largest minimum
Pell Grants.
2.4.2 Estimation
The basic estimating equation that takes advantage of this discontinuity in
EFC eligibility is:
Y = f(E˜FC) + θ · 1(E˜FC < 0) +Xβ + ηu +  for|E˜FC| < h (2.1)
17During the summers of 2009, 2010, and 2011 students were eligible for a “third semester” of Pell
Grants. Notably students were also eligible for an additional semester of SMART Grants during
this time.
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where Y is the outcome of interest, f(E˜FC) is a flexible function of junior-year re-
centered EFC where EFC is re-centered so that E˜FC = (EFC −MaxEFC)/1000
and MaxEFC is the maximum EFC in a given year that is allowable to qualify for
Pell Grants. This re-centering means that E˜FC being 0 or negative indicates a per-
son was eligible for a Pell Grant. X is a vector of covariates including indicators for
student race (African American, Hispanic, Asian, missing race, with White omit-
ted), and parent’s highest educational attainment indicators.18 University fixed
effects, ηu are included when using the Texas data. 19
In some instances, the above equation is estimated but f(E˜FC) and 1(E˜FC <
0) are interacted with indicators for student characteristics. This allows a compar-
ison of the discontinuities for two groups of students and also accommodates the
implementation of a Regression Discontinuity Difference estimator and compares
the discontinuity in the years of the program to the discontinuity in the years be-
fore the program.
Choice of Student Classification for EFC
In order to be eligible for federal aid–and in many cases any financial aid–
students must submit a FAFSA every year. The EFC calculated from the informa-
18At BYU this also includes information about ACT/SAT score as well as high school percentile
and does not include parental education indicators.
19As in Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010), estimating f(E˜FC) using ker-
nel regression with a rectangular kernel yields the same results as a linear regression on a local
subsample allowing the slopes to vary on either side of the cutoff; as such, we estimate this equa-
tion using Ordinary Least Squares. The covariates are only included to increase precision and are
not necessary for identification.
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tion on the FAFSA applies from the semester that the FAFSA is submitted until the
following Fall semester.20 As a result, our data potentially contain several mea-
sures of EFC for each student. Many factors impact which EFC measure is the
appropriate one for our analysis. On one hand, using the EFC from the students’
junior or senior year may be best since those are the measures that actually deter-
mine SMART Grant eligibility. On the other hand, using an earlier year might be
best since many students likely choose their major before their junior year. Ulti-
mately, we use the EFC from the students’ junior year for several reasons.
It is critical for the research design that students are able to respond to their
eligibility for SMART Grants by altering their choice of major. Because freshman
or sophomore EFC do not convey information about SMART Grant eligibility we
opt not to use freshman or sophomore measures.
In contrast, in most instances juniors will know their precise eligibility for
SMART Grants before making choices about their college major in their first semester
as a junior. Returning students typically file the FAFSA in the spring before the
school year. This allows students to know their Pell (and SMART) eligibility before
making choices about their major in the next year. Figure 2.1 depicts the fraction of
eventual junior FAFSA filers that have filed their FAFSA by a particular date in the
2007-08 National Postsecondary Aid Survey cohort. This figure shows that 67% of
juniors who eventually will file a FAFSA have submitted their FAFSA by the end
20If a student has a life event that would change their EFC after their FAFSA has been submitted,
a student may amend their FAFSA and receive Federal Grant money for the semester in which they
submit the amendment if they then qualify.
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of May and 83% by the end of July. Consequently, most juniors will know their
eligibility for the SMART Grant when deciding what major they should pursue in
their junior year. This is especially true when a student’s first semester as a junior
occurs in Spring or Summer semesters due to the extra time to file the FAFSA.
The timing of the federal financial aid process and the rules of the SMART
Grant made it so that most students would know their eligibility for the SMART
Grant before their first semester classified as a junior. However, students near the
eligibility threshold would not know about their eligibility more than a year in ad-
vance. We use junior EFC as the running variable because it determines eligibility
for the program and is known by most students far enough in advance to affect
their behavior.
2.4.3 Choice of Years to Include in Estimation
Choosing which years to include in the analysis is an important considera-
tion for several reasons. Our goal in choosing the years is to identify the students
who were “treated” by the SMART Grant program. For this reason we focus on a
student’s junior year as an indicator for treatment because it is the first year a stu-
dent can actually receive funding from the grant. In both the BYU and the Texas
data we start by including students who were juniors in 2006-2007. The number of
SMART Grants awarded increased throughout the life of the grant, and it is likely
that salience increased as well. Additionally, students in their junior year at the
beginning of the program would likely have higher switching costs because they
had already invested time in their chosen major. Students who were juniors later
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would have potentially known about the program for the entirety of their college
career, and as such, would be more likely to respond to the grant. For this reason
we also present analysis for students who were juniors in the last three years of the
program, in the 2008-2009 to 2010-2011 school years, and expect there to be bigger
effects in those years.
Choosing the last year for treatment is done under the goal of maximizing
the number of students treated. The SMART Grant program started in the Fall
of 2006 and was discontinued in the Summer of 2011. For this reason, we use all
students who were juniors during the life of the program. We also examine the
years before the SMART Grant and the one year afterwards as placebo exercises.
2.4.4 Assumptions for Regression Discontinuity
One assumption of the regression discontinuity estimator is that students
are not able to precisely manipulate their EFC to gain access to the grant. If stu-
dents in SMART Grant eligible majors precisely manipulate their EFC to be eligi-
ble for Pell Grants or were more likely to submit a FAFSA conditional on being
Pell eligible, the distribution of EFC would have a discontinuity at the eligibility
threshold with additional weight to the left of the threshold (just-eligible students).
Fortunately for our identification, the formula for determining EFC is complicated
and opaque, using a large number of current and historical factors, making it diffi-
cult to manipulate EFC precisely. We test manipulation and selection by analyzing
the distribution of EFC around the threshold. Figure 2.2 displays the density of
EFC reported in both the BYU and THECB data and it does not show evidence
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of manipulation. Oddly, in both data sets, it appears that there are actually fewer
students to the left of the threshold that to the right, which is the opposite of what
would be expected if there were manipulation of EFCs or differential reporting.
In formal testing of this manipulation as outlined in McCrary (2008), the discon-
tinuity is significant in Texas when considering students who were juniors from
2006-2011, but the discontinuity drops in magnitude and is no longer statistically
significant when considering juniors from 2008-2011. At BYU, the manipulation
is never statistically significant but again goes in the direction of students moving
out of eligibility. In other samples Turner (2014) and Evans (2012) find these same
visually suggestive but statistically insignificant distributional attributes. Given
all this evidence, we believe this form of selection bias is likely to be negligible.
Another assumption is that observed and unobserved student characteris-
tics do not vary discretely at the EFC eligibility threshold. We test that observed
student characteristics do not vary by estimating Equation 1 with the outcome vari-
able being student characteristics, and results are presented in Table 2.2. We also
test that school characteristics do not change by checking to see if school character-
istics such as the fraction of SMART majors or Pell Eligible students at a university
changes at the threshold. For all Texas schools there are 14 covariates considered,
and in the time frame from in both 2006-2011 and 2008-2011, there is never any sta-
tistically significant discontinuity in covariates. For the 11 coefficients at BYU from
2006-2011 there are no statistically significant differences at the 5% level. Similarly
for 2008-2011 at BYU only one coefficient is significant at the 5% level. Given that
we are testing for discontinuities in 24 covariates in two time frames, finding only
77
one that appears significant at the 5% level is what we would expect under that
hypothesis that student characteristics are smooth through the threshold. Overall
there is evidence that observable student characteristics do not vary discretely at
the threshold for Pell/SMART eligibility, increasing our confidence in the causal
estimates found below.
Outcome Variables
The primary outcomes considered are being declared in a SMART eligible
major at the beginning of a student’s junior or senior year or earning a SMART
eligible degree. Specifically, the junior major variable is a binary variable that in-
dicates if a student is declared in a SMART eligible major in the first semester that
they are classified as a junior. This variable is only defined for students whom we
observe in their junior year. The senior major variable is defined as unity if the
student is declared a SMART major in the first semester of their senior year and 0
if they are declared in a non SMART major in their senior year or do not appear as
seniors in the data.
The degree outcome is a binary variable that indicates if a student receives
a degree in a SMART Grant qualified major. This variable is only defined for all
students who have a valid EFC measurement as a junior and is a one if a student
receives a diploma in any field in the time-frame studied and a 0 if the student
receives a degree in a non SMART field or does not receive a degree. Because
many students in the last years of our data will not have had sufficient time to
graduate, the fraction of students graduating will be lower than it would be if
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we had additional years of data. At BYU we have data on coursework, so we also
consider the fraction of credits earned that are in SMART fields in a student’s junior
or senior year. Students who are not observed taking courses as seniors have will
have the fraction of their courses in SMART fields coded as 0.
To confirm that the grant was administered in a discontinuous way, we con-
sider actual receipt of the grant as an outcome as well. We express this as the total
amount of SMART Grant dollars ever received as well as an indicator for whether
a student ever receives SMART Grant money to provide evidence that there was
a discontinuity in SMART Grant receipt. We perform this analysis separately for
students who were declared as SMART majors as juniors, as well as for students
who were not declared as SMART majors as juniors.
The optimal bandwidth, h, was chosen using the optimal bandwidth rule
of thumb (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012) and is roughly 2.0 for the BYU data
and 1.0 for the Texas data, although the actual optimum varies by outcome.21 We
show later, however, that our results are not sensitive to our choice of bandwidth.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity in all specifications.
In all specifications, the parameter θ from equation 1 is the coefficient of
interest. It represents the average effect of a student becoming EFC-eligible for
a SMART Grant in their junior year. That is, a student could receive the grant if
they were eligible in other ways (e.g. major in an appropriate field, have a high
enough GPA, etc.) Since students may be eligible by EFC but not be eligible by
21For degrees the bandwidth is 1.2, total SMART Grant received has a bandwidth of 1.6, and ever
received a SMART Grant uses a bandwidth of .9.
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other criteria (other than major), θ may be considered a lower bound on the impact
of otherwise eligible students.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Grant Receipt
As discussed above, using a single year’s EFC is not a perfect way to sep-
arate eligible and ineligible groups since students who are eligible in their junior
year may no longer be eligible in their senior year. In the extreme, this could mean
that students local to the eligibility threshold may all receive similar amounts of
SMART Grant money on average, regardless of which side of the threshold they
are on in their junior year. If this effect is so exaggerated that there is no mea-
surable discontinuity in grant money received at the eligibility threshold, then a
regression discontinuity design would not be appropriate since there is no discon-
tinuity in treatment.
We test for a discontinuity in SMART Grant receipt with a regression dis-
continuity analysis of total SMART Grant awards. The total SMART Grant award
variable is the sum of all of the SMART Grants received. We conduct this analy-
sis separately for students who are declared as SMART majors in their junior year
as well as for students declared in any other majors. Graphical results based on
these regressions are found in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 and the estimates from these
regressions are found in Table 2.3 .
These regressions highlight several important considerations in our analy-
sis. We see in the figures that there is a clear and unambiguous discontinuity at
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the threshold for students declared in SMART majors. However, for students not
declared in SMART majors there is not discontinuity in terms of grant eligibility as
would be expected. In Table 2.3 all of these discontinuities are significant at the 1%
level for students in SMART majors and zero for students not in SMART majors.
In the SMART Grant amount regressions in the 2008-2011, we estimate at discon-
tinuity for students declared in SMART majors of of about $589 for Texas students
and $1,772 for BYU students. These measurements are all slightly smaller when
we use the 2006-07 to 2010-11 samples. There is no discontinuity in SMART Grant
dollars for students in non SMART majors as would be expected.
The magnitude of these discontinuities give a sense of how binding other
conditions of the grant are for students. In Texas the estimate is substantially
smaller than the estimate at BYU suggesting that other factors (like GPA) play a
larger role in determining eligibility at Texas universities than at BYU.
A second thing that can be learned from the figures is that we are measuring
eligibility at one point in time while eligibility will be determined several times.
That is, if students’ eligibility was entirely determined by their junior year EFC,
we would expect the level on the right (corresponding to ineligible students) to
be zero. The positive values for ineligible juniors give a sense of the fraction of
students who are ineligible in their junior year but are eligible in later semesters.
In Figure 2.4, there are non-negligible positive values to the right of the threshold.
For instance, of the just-ineligible students at Texas public universities in eligible
fields, about 15 percent eventually receive money in a later year. This contrasts
with the approximately 30 percent of students who receive SMART Grant money
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who barely meet the EFC criterion in their junior year. At BYU, approximately
30% of EFC-ineligible junior students in SMART majors eventually receive SMART
Grant money relative to 70% for EFC-eligible junior SMART majors.
2.5.2 Student Outcomes
Majors, Diplomas, and Courses To test the impact of SMART Grants on student
major, we look at a variety of outcomes. In both the Texas and BYU data, we have
information on the declared majors of junior and senior students and also infor-
mation on the diploma they eventually received. In the BYU data, we addition-
ally have information on the fraction of classes that were taken in SMART eligible
fields. We conduct our analysis with a 2006-07 to 2010-11 subsample and a 2008-09
to 2010-11 subsample, but for these regressions we also measure the discontinu-
ity for students who were juniors before 2006 as a robustness check. Results from
regressions are in Table 2.4. Graphical evidence is presented on junior major in Fig-
ure 2.5, on senior major in Figure 2.6, degrees granted in Figure 2.7, and courses
taken at BYU are found in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.5 contains plots of the estimated regression lines superimposed
over a bin-scatter plot for all of our specifications corresponding to the junior ma-
jor outcome variable. In the Texas plots, a small but clear discontinuity can be seen
at the threshold in the 2006-2011 data and an even larger discontinuity can be seen
in the 2008-2011 data. In the BYU plots, the discontinuity is much larger. Figure
2.6 gives parallel figures but for the senior declared major outcome.
The estimates from these regression in Table 2.4 tell the same story as can
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be seen in the figures. In Texas in the 2006-2011 sample for both junior and senior
major, a positive but insignificant effect of about 1.5 percentage points is measured.
When we restrict our sample to only students who were juniors from 2008-09 to
2010-11, the magnitude of the effect in both regressions doubles to 3.27 percent-
age points for junior and 3.18 percentage points for senior major , and both are
significant at the 5% level. This discontinuity indicates that roughly 3% students
responded to the incentives of the grant and adjusted or persisted in their choice
of major.
This is consistent with students who are already several years into the uni-
versity studies either being unaware of the program in its early years or for the
switching costs of changing into a qualified major being too high to motivate a
large number of students to switch their major. Including these early students at-
tenuates our measure to insignificant levels. This 3 percentage point increase is
over a baseline SMART participation rate of 18% which is 17 percent increase over
the baseline.
At BYU in the 2006-07 to 2010-11 sample, we measure a larger effect of al-
most 7 percentage points for both junior major, but this effect is only significant
at the 10% level. For senior major the effect is larger at 8 percentage points and is
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Similar to the Texas data, when we
restrict our sample to the 2008-09 to 2010-11 sample, we measure an impact of 10
percentage points with 95% confidence. This gives further evidence of an increas-
ing impact in later years of the program. This increase is over a baseline of 22.4%
which is a 45 percent increase over the baseline
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As discussed above, we attribute a large portion of the magnitude differ-
ences between Texas and BYU to the greater salience of the program.22 Since a
much larger of fraction of BYU students are eligible for Pell Grants, more students
would have heard of the SMART Grant program through informal channels, mak-
ing it more likely that this program could have an effect. It is also possible, how-
ever, that other characteristics of the student body or universities accounts for this
heterogeneity, such as different policies for declaring majors, differential response
to the incentives across schools, or that income-marginal students in Texas may be
less likely to be qualified along other margins such as GPA or citizenship. Anec-
dotally, we know that some BYU departments used the SMART Grant to recruit
students into certain majors.23
In Texas, we are unable to detect an impact of SMART Grants on the num-
ber of diplomas awarded in SMART eligible fields. This is seen in Figure 2.7. There
is no apparent discontinuity in the Texas plots, and in the BYU plots, the estimated
discontinuity is obscured by a lack of precision in the data. The regression results
in Table 2.4 confirm what we see in the figures: the impact of the grant on eligible
degrees granted at Texas public universities is virtually zero, and the 6.6 percent-
age point effects measured at BYU is marginally statistically significant. This is
likely because the data only contain degrees for students who have finished by
2012. Many students who were juniors during the life of the program had not
22This difference is also likely due to differences in eligibility on other dimensions like GPA.
23We reached out to all Texas public universities to try to examine if similar advertising was
done but only received a handful of responses. All respondents indicated that they had not done
any recruiting using the SMART Grant.
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graduated by 2012 and therefore are treated as if the grant had no impact on their
diploma in our data. In a few years when these students have graduated, it may
be possible to measure the impact of SMART Grants on diplomas awarded. Since
our data suggest that students at BYU responded more strongly and earlier to this
program, it is unsurprising that a small impact on diplomas awarded can already
be detected even with our limited data. However, students at Texas responded
most strongly in the last year of the program. As a results, even those students
who eventually graduated in SMART field as a result of the grant would only be
coded as having responded if they graduated in no more than one year after they
were first classified as a junior. This is uncommon, suggesting that a more accurate
measure for this particular outcome would be possible to obtain if more years of
data were available.
At BYU, we also have data on the specific courses students are taking.24
This allows us to test whether students are “gaming” the program by signing up
for eligible majors to receive the SMART Grant money but not taking courses in the
major since they never intend to complete it. We attempt to identify this by mea-
suring the discontinuity as before, but using as the outcome variable the fraction of
courses that a student takes in SMART eligible departments. Despite a small sam-
ple size, we see that both the point estimates for the fraction of courses taken by
juniors and seniors class taking are positive and are marginally statistically signif-
icant. These results give credence to the claim that the measured impacts on con-
24The THECB only recently started collected course-level data, so we could not conduct this
analysis with their larger data set.
85
temporary major are a result of students adjusting their actual major in response
to the program rather than students gaming the system.
We also conduct a placebo test by performing the same regressions for stu-
dents in the years before the SMART Grant was instituted. With one exception,
each of these regression coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant.
The exceptional case is the effect on junior major at Texas, for which we measure
a small but marginally significant impact of 1.7 percentage points. Since we only
measure an impact as large as 3 percentage points in our 2008-2011 Texas regres-
sion, this placebo estimate cannot be statistically separated from the measured im-
pact in the years the grant was operating. This may raise concerns that the effect
we measure in our main specifications are not due to SMART Grant but rather
due to other factors that existed before the SMART Grant program. Several things,
however, make us believe that this placebo estimate should not be so concerning.
First, this oddity disappears in the senior major placebo regression, which includes
the same students but measured a year closer to graduation. Also, this junior year
placebo test oddity is not present in the BYU data. Additionally, in the year after
the program there is no effect on student major declaration in the junior or senior
year at Texas or at BYU which can be seen in Table 2.5. This evidence suggests
that the effect we measure is actually the impact of SMART Grants rather than Pell
Grants or other programs that might discretely vary across the Pell Grant eligibility
threshold.
We formally estimate the difference in the pre period vs. 2008-09 to 2010-11
in Table 2.4 using a Regression Discontinuity Difference estimator. In Texas there is
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always a positive effect measured though it is only statistically different for senior
major. At BYU the results are similar to estimates using data only from 2008-09
to 2010-11 though the results are slightly less precise with only junior major being
marginally statistically significant.
Effects by Year The regressions above suggest that there may be a large amount
of heterogeneity across time, and more specifically, the impact of SMART Grants
grew over the lifetime of the grant program. To examine the heterogeneity of the
effect across time we estimate the discontinuity separately by pairs of years except
for the last year for which we have data. Specifically, the regressions estimate the
discontinuity for students who were juniors in the school years beginning in 2001-
02 to 2002-03 . These estimates are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals in
Figure 2.9. The actual regression results are found in Table 2.5.
Clearly, reducing the sample in each of these regressions drastically reduces
our ability to precisely measure the yearly impact. Several patterns emerge from
these regressions nonetheless. First, in all of the sets of regressions, the only regres-
sions reaching any level of significance are those corresponding to the 2009-10 to
2010-11 junior cohort. We note that the regressions meet 90% confidence at BYU for
both junior and senior major, and meet 95% confidence in the in Texas for junior
and senior major. The magnitude of these regressions is slightly larger than the
2008-2011 estimates reported before. Second, in every regression corresponding to
years before SMART Grants were being distributed, the estimates are insignificant
and effectively zero in magnitude.
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The measured discontinuity sharply drops for junior and senior major when
the grant expires in the 2011-12 school year in both the BYU and the Texas data.
This is an additional falsification test in addition to using previous years. The es-
timated zero effect reinforce the idea that the measured discontinuities are related
directly to the SMART Grant incentives rather than other changes occurring (e.g.
Pell Grant) at the discontinuity.
We interpret these patterns as reinforcing our previous result that the im-
pact of SMART Grants were small or absent in early years but that the impact of
the grant grew over time. There are several reasons this pattern could emerge but
two seem most likely: first, students needed time to adjust their plans so that the
first cohorts of students were less likely to adjust their major; and second, salience
is likely to have increased throughout the life of the grant. This second point gives
further merit to the hypothesis of increased salience at BYU due to a higher fraction
of Pell-eligible students.
The difference in salience in early years between BYU and public Texas uni-
versities may also explain the heterogeneity of the impact of SMART Grants on
degrees granted. The estimate for Texas degrees was estimated as zero while a
moderately-sized, imprecise impact was measured in the BYU data. In Texas pub-
lic universities, the impact of this grant in early years seems negligible or non ex-
istent, while the effect at BYU can been seen in the first years that the grant was
available. If the grant had no impact on declared majors in Texas in its early years,
we would not expect to see any impact on diplomas granted for these same stu-
dents. Alternatively, since students responded earlier at BYU, some effect may be
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seen in the time-frame for which we have data.
Specific Majors Since SMART Grants gave incentives for several classes of major,
there is also interest in decomposing the effect into the impact on each of these
smaller classes. Of particular interest would be a decomposition into the impact
on STEM majors and language majors. We do this by running separate regressions
using a binary variable for the applicable subgroups. These results can be found
in Table 2.6.
In Texas, we see that there was a 3.08% increase in junior STEM majors and
0.4% increase in junior language majors. The magnitudes are similar for senior
majors as well. All of these measures sit very close to the 95% confidence level.
This suggests that for junior major, the impact on STEM fields accounts for 87%
of the total impact, and for senior majors, it accounts for 80%. The increase in lan-
guage majors is notable because it is a 0.4 percentage point increase over a baseline
of 0.7% for juniors and a 0.64 percentage point increase over a baseline of .9% for
seniors. The results at BYU are too noisy to make any strong claims about the de-
composition, but they again show that the bulk of the effect was in STEM fields.
Ultimately it appears that while language majors are different from STEM majors
in many ways, financial incentives increased the number of declared majors in
both cases.
We hoped to measure which majors these new students were coming from
by examining other classes of majors in a similar manner, but our results suffered
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from a lack of statistical precision, and no consistent patterns emerged.25 While
some of the regressions passed low levels of significance, none of them were strong
enough to convincingly rule out significance purely due to multiple testing.
2.5.3 Contrast with Evans (2012) and Replication
As mentioned above, Evans (2012) also examines SMART Grants using data
from Ohio universities of students who entered college in 2006-2007 and follow-
ing them through spring 2010. Using a similar Regression Discontinuity design
on Ohio data, he finds no evidence of an impact of SMART Grants on students
majoring in STEM fields.
Several of our results lend insight into why our estimates differ. Primarily,
Evans has less statistical power that we do and is trying to measure an impact that
is smaller than what we are measuring. First, our analysis measures the impact of
SMART Grants on all eligible majors while Evans only considered STEM majors.
Since it appears that language majors make up about 20% of the effect, he is trying
to measure a smaller value than we are. Second, Evans’ sample is much smaller
than ours since he restricts it only to students who enter college in 2006-2007 while
we use all students who are juniors or seniors during the lifetime of the grant. That
is, our analysis includes all students who Evans would include and also students
who start earlier and progress more slowly to graduation or who start later and
progress more quickly. Third, Evans doesn’t include data for the last year that the
SMART Grant program existed. Our analysis suggests that there was an increas-
25These results are available upon request.
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ing impact of the program over time, meaning that Evans is trying to measure a
smaller impact that what we measure in our analysis. Of course, it is possible that
the measured difference is simply due to geographic heterogeneity, and the pro-
gram had a larger impact in Texas than in Ohio. This would be consistent with the
measured differences we observe between public universities in Texas and at BYU.
However, the Texas and Ohio data both include primarily large public universities
that are similar in observable characteristics, making it seem more likely that we
would observe similar effects in each sample.
An additional relative strength of our data set is we observe grant receipt
directly and can measure the size of the discontinuity in grant receipt. The final
difference is that we are able to examine the years prior to the grant as a placebo
test. This provides a valuable falsification test that allows us to attribute our es-
timates to the grant program as opposed to chance or effects from the Pell Grant
program.
To test if Evans’ data restrictions and outcome variable are sufficient to ac-
count for his lack of a measured impact, we restrict our sample in the same way,
only including students entering college in 2006-2007 and removing all data after
spring 2010, and measure the impact of SMART Grants on STEM majors. These
replication results, which are found in Table 2.7, fail to be statistically significant
much like Evans (2012), although the magnitude of the estimates are similar to
those in our main analysis.26 We believe that this is evidence that a significant
26We use the optimal bandwidth in the Texas data using the data restrictions described for the
replication exercise because bandwidth selection is dependent on the data set used.
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portion of the difference between Evans’ and our estimates is purely due to the
empirical issues described above. We can’t measure, however, to what degree, if
any, heterogeneity accounts for the remaining measured difference.
2.5.4 Heterogeneity/Robustness
There is significant interest nationally to increase the number of women and
minorities in STEM fields. One might be interested, therefore, if SMART Grants
had a differential impact on these groups. To test this, we run extended models that
include interaction terms between the group we are examining (e.g. gender) and
the slope and discontinuity terms. The coefficient associated with the interaction
between the discontinuity variable and the group indicator would identify any
between-group heterogeneity. Unfortunately, in each of these specifications, no
significant differences could be identified. Given that our samples are only barely
large enough to measure the main effect in many cases, this lack of result may
simply be due to lack of power.
As a final robustness check, we test how sensitive our results are to the
choice of bandwidth. We this by repeating our junior and senior declared ma-
jor regressions with the Texas and BYU data, but with various bandwidths in a
500 EFC-unit neighborhood of the optimal one. We also include examine band-
widths that are 1,000 or 2,000 EFC units than the optimal bandwidths. The co-
efficients of these regressions and their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in
Figure 2.10 and reported in Table 2.8. The figure shows that our estimates are
quite stable for all bandwidths tested. Generally, the wider bandwidths produce
92
slightly smaller estimates which we attribute to increasing bias associated with
larger bandwidths. The ideal comparison in a regression discontinuity setting is
the students just above and below the cutoff. As data further from the disconti-
nuity is used, the modeled relationship between EFC and major choice becomes
more reliant on students who are increasingly dissimilar in family income. As a
result, estimates using data closer to the cutoff is likely to be less biased but less
precise. As an additional check on the functional form of f(x), we use quadratic in
recentered EFC that is allowed to be different on each side of the threshold. These
results are also presented in Table 2.8 and the results are qualitatively very similar
to the local linear results presented before with the Texas estimates being slightly
smaller and the BYU estimates being slightly larger.
There is still the question of whether the impact of SMART Grants operates
primarily through persistence in SMART fields or through switching into SMART
fields from ineligible fields. We examine this question by interacting the running
variable and discontinuity with an indicator for being declared as a SMART ma-
jor in a student’s sophomore year. The results are presented in Table 2.9 where
we detect no significant differences in the discontinuities for students declared in
SMART majors as sophomores in any of these regressions. However, the point es-
timates suggest that if anything. the effects are concentrated among students who
were declared in SMART majors as sophomores. Many students leave STEM ma-
jors as they advance through college and it appears that the SMART Grant may
have partially mitigated this flow from STEM fields. Students already in SMART
majors as sophomores would have another potential avenue for information about
93
the grant. These students may have filed the FAFSA and found out about the
existence of the grant because they were awarded it. Students who received the
SMART Grant would then be able to alter their plan to switch from STEM but
students who did not receive the grant would have no such incentives.27
2.6 Conclusion
This analysis of the SMART Grant Program provides evidence that students
respond to direct financial incentives when choosing their major. This is the first
evidence that a student’s major can be influenced by targeted grants and repre-
sents an interesting policy intervention. The magnitude of the impact is of note
given that the mean differences in earnings in eligible and ineligible fields are
much larger than the $4,000 a year offered by the SMART Grant program. These
relatively small financial incentives may have had an effect because students are
credit constrained, uniformed about differences in earnings, or are myopic. Alter-
natively, it could be that these mean differences across fields do not reflect well
the true counter-factuals in earnings for these students. This result, however, is
consistent with the larger body of literature that finds that financial aid can have
significant impacts on student outcomes.
These results also show that there can be a high level of heterogeneity in the
impact over time and geographically. For instance, in Texas it appears that effect
is too small to be measured in early years of the grant but that it grew to nearly 4
27The heterogeneity results are available from the authors upon request.
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percentage points from a base-line of 18%. Some of this growth may be a result of
early students being too invested in their pre-SMART Grant majors to switch as a
result of the grant, but we believe that it was likely due to increasing salience of
the program as students learned it existed. Similarly, BYU saw growth over time,
but at much higher levels. Since BYU has a much higher fraction of students who
qualify for Pell Grants and up to 5% of the students received SMART Grants at
some point in college, it is likely that many student had heard about the grants
from other students.
Our results also indicate that there is a differential impact across fields of
study. While only 20% of the impact of the SMART Grant program was in lan-
guage fields, the much lower baseline means that SMART Grants nearly doubled
the fraction of students going into language fields. Our further analysis was un-
able to detect which majors these additional students in STEM and language came
from.
We also attempt to decompose what fraction of our measured effect is due
to students persisting in eligible fields versus switching to eligible fields. We are
not well-powered enough to disentangle these two mechanisms, though our point
estimates suggest that persistence may play a more significant role in this program
than switching.
Because the grant was discontinued and because the students from the end
of the program’s life only had one year to complete their degree by the time our
data concludes, it is difficult to determine if the number of SMART degrees awarded
changed. In the future, we hope to extend this research by collecting more years
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of data, allowing us to measure the impact of the SMART Grant program on ac-
tual diplomas received and the number of people eventually entering STEM fields.
We also hope to use the SMART Grant as an instrument to measure the impact of
majoring in a STEM field on various employment outcomes such as employment,
employment in a STEM field, and earnings.
Several lessons emerge from this program. First, policy makers can in-
fluence the choice of major using targeted financial incentives. Second, students
choices among heterogeneous human capital investments are affected by factors
outside of long term costs and benefits. Third, programs that target student major
may need a longer time frame because juniors or seniors may be unlikely to adjust
their decision about field of study. Lastly, salience plays a fundamental role in the
success of these sorts of programs; unadvertised and unknown programs can be
expensive and have little impact on outcomes of interest.
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2.7 Figures & Tables
2.7.1 Figures
Figure 2.1: Timing of FAFSA Submission
This figure represents the CDF of FAFSA filing for juniors in the 2007-08 NPSAS.
The school year starts in August 2007 and is represented by the dashed line. The
vertical line at June 07 is to highlight that the bulk of FAFSA submissions occurs
several months prior to the school year starting.
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Figure 2.2: Density of Jr EFC
Texas
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
BYU
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
These figures depict the density of recentered EFC in the first semester a student is
classified as a junior. EFC is recentered so that SMART eligibility occurs to the left
of 0 and EFC is divided by 1,000.
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Figure 2.3: Total SMART Grant
Texas
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
SMART Majors
Not SMART Majors
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BYU
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
SMART Majors
Not SMART Majors
The average amount of the SMART Grants received is plotted against recentered
junior EFC. Each dot represents the average for students in a bin of 200 EFC. EFC
is recentered so that SMART eligibility occurs to the left of 0 and EFC is divided by
1,000. The size of the dot is proportional to the number of observations included
in the average. The lines represent linear predictions allowed to vary on each side
of the cutoff. The bandwidth used at Texas 1.0 and the bandwidth at BYU is 2.0.
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Figure 2.4: Ever Receive SMART Grant
Texas
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
SMART Majors
Not SMART Majors
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BYU
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
SMART Majors
Not SMART Majors
The probability of ever receiving a SMART Grant is plotted against recentered ju-
nior EFC. Each dot represents the average for students in a bin of 200 EFC. EFC is
recentered so that SMART eligibility occurs to the left of 0 and EFC is divided by
1,000. The size of the dot is proportional to the number of observations included
in the average. The lines represent linear predictions allowed to vary on each side
of the cutoff. The bandwidth used at Texas 1.0 and the bandwidth at BYU is 3.6.
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Figure 2.5: SMART Major in Jr Year
Texas
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11 Pre 2006
BYU
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11 Pre 2006
The probability of having a SMART major declared in the first semester of a stu-
dent’s junior year is plotted against recentered junior EFC. Each dot represents the
average for students in a bin of 200 EFC. EFC is recentered so that SMART eligi-
bility occurs to the left of 0 and EFC is divided by 1,000. The size of the dot is
proportional to the number of observations included in the average. The lines rep-
resent linear predictions allowed to vary on each side of the cutoff. The bandwidth
used at Texas 1.0 and the bandwidth at BYU is 2.0.
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Figure 2.6: SMART Major in Sr Year
All Texas Schools
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11 Pre 2006
BYU
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11 Pre 2006
The probability of having a SMART major declared in the first semester of a stu-
dent’s senior year is plotted against recentered junior EFC. Each dot represents the
average for students in a bin of 200 EFC. EFC is recentered so that SMART eli-
gibility occurs to the left of 0 and EFC is divided by 1,000.The size of the dot is
proportional to the number of observations included in the average. The lines rep-
resent linear predictions allowed to vary on each side of the cutoff. The bandwidth
used at Texas 1.0 and the bandwidth at BYU is 2.0.
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Figure 2.7: SMART Degree
Texas
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11 Pre 2006
BYU
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11 Pre 2006
The probability of receiving a SMART degree is plotted against recentered junior
EFC. Each dot represents the average for students in a bin of .2 scaled EFC. The size
of the dot is proportional to the number of observations included in the average.
The lines represent linear predictions allowed to vary on each side of the cutoff.
The bandwidth used at Texas 1.0 and the bandwidth at BYU is 2.0.
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Figure 2.8: Fraction SMART Classes–BYU Only
Jr. Year
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11 Pre 2006
Sr. Year
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11 Pre 2006
The fraction of classes taken in SMART fields is plotted against recentered junior
EFC. Each dot represents the average for students in a bin of 200 EFC. EFC is re-
centered so that SMART eligibility occurs to the left of 0 and EFC is divided by
1,000. The size of the dot is proportional to the number of observations included
in the average. The lines represent linear predictions allowed to vary on each side
of the cutoff. The bandwidth used for juniors is 2.0 and the bandwidth for seniors
is 1.8.
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Figure 2.9: Estimates by Year
Texas
Junior Major Senior Major
BYU
Junior Major Senior Major
The estimated discontinuity for the impact of SMART Grants on majors is plotted
along with 95% confidence intervals. The years represent the end of a school year
and the preceding two school years (e.g. 2003 is the 2001-02 and 2002-03 school
year). The exception is in 2012 which is only estimated using data from the 2011-
12 school year A bandwidth of 1.1 is used for Texas and 2.5 is used for BYU.
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Figure 2.10: Various Bandwidths
Texas
Junior Major Senior Major
BYU
Junior Major Senior Major
Estimates of the impact of SMART Grants on majors is plotted for various band-
widths. The bandwidths vary by +/-.5 around the optimal bandwidth. These
estimates are for the 2008-09 to 2010-11 school years.
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2.7.2 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Texas
2000/01 - 2005/06 2006-07 to 2010-11
mean sd mean sd
Junior Language Major 0.008 0.092 0.007 0.085
Junior Technical Major 0.179 0.383 0.185 0.388
Jr SMART Major 0.188 0.390 0.192 0.394
Senior Language Major 0.010 0.097 0.008 0.088
Senior Technical Major 0.153 0.360 0.154 0.361
Senior SMART Major 0.163 0.369 0.162 0.368
Technical Degree 0.134 0.341 0.099 0.299
Language Degree 0.010 0.101 0.008 0.088
SMART Degree 0.144 0.351 0.107 0.309
SMART Grant Amount 34.073 384.670 190.280 949.427
Ever Receive SMART Grant 0.009 0.094 0.047 0.212
Pell Eligible 0.579 0.494 0.552 0.497
Junior EFC -0.221 1.149 -0.152 1.149
Male 0.404 0.491 0.428 0.495
Black 0.127 0.333 0.147 0.354
White 0.515 0.500 0.475 0.499
Asian 0.070 0.254 0.078 0.268
Missing Race 0.016 0.124 0.072 0.258
Hispanic 0.273 0.445 0.300 0.458
Mother Ed <= HS 0.533 0.499 0.515 0.500
Father Ed <= HS 0.501 0.500 0.517 0.500
Texas Resident 0.969 0.174 0.967 0.179
College Father 0.370 0.483 0.376 0.484
College Mother 0.374 0.484 0.416 0.493
Missing Mother Ed 0.093 0.291 0.070 0.254
Missing Father Ed 0.129 0.335 0.108 0.310
Hispanic 0.273 0.445 0.300 0.458
Observations 37754 45189
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Table 2.1: (cont.)
BYU
2001-02 to 2005-06 2006-07 to 2010-11
mean sd mean sd
Male 0.533 0.499 0.524 0.499
White 0.813 0.390 0.877 0.328
Black 0.007 0.083 0.006 0.078
Missing Race 0.025 0.157 0.017 0.130
Hispanic 0.040 0.196 0.048 0.214
Asian 0.017 0.129 0.024 0.154
ACT Score 25.892 3.382 26.036 3.501
HS Percentile 0.165 0.125 0.173 0.141
Missing ACT 0.113 0.317 0.100 0.300
Missing HS Percentile 0.297 0.457 0.223 0.416
Junior EFC -0.861 1.634 -0.693 1.672
Pell Eligible 0.709 0.454 0.670 0.470
Frac. SMART classes Jr 0.299 0.267 0.333 0.264
Frac. SMART classes Sr 0.283 0.296 0.303 0.315
Total SMART Grant 217.109 992.427 923.318 2027.641
Ever Receive SMART 0.052 0.223 0.201 0.401
Jr SMART Major 0.224 0.417 0.271 0.445
Sr SMART Major 0.225 0.418 0.244 0.430
SMART Degree 0.226 0.418 0.174 0.379
Jr Tech. Major 0.203 0.402 0.245 0.430
Sr Tech. Major 0.203 0.402 0.217 0.412
Tech Degree 0.182 0.386 0.135 0.342
Jr Lang. Major 0.021 0.142 0.027 0.162
Sr Lang. Major 0.022 0.148 0.027 0.163
Lang. Degree 0.030 0.169 0.028 0.165
Observations 6994 3754
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Table 2.1: (cont.)
These summary statistics are produced from data provided by the Texas Higher
Education Coordinating Board and Brigham Young University. Each observation
represents a student with a valid EFC measurement in their junior year and the
data is restricted to a window around the Pell/SMART Eligibility threshold of
2,000 EFC and 3,000 EFC at BYU.
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Table 2.2: Covariate Checks
Texas
Covariates
2005/06-2010/11
Male Black Asian Hispanic Missing Missing Missing
Race Mot. Ed. Fat. Ed.
Discon. 0.00823 0.00473 0.00341 -0.00666 0.00456 -0.00187 0.0121
SE (0.0136) (0.00875) (0.00714) (0.0113) (0.00713) (0.00689) (0.00849)
N 20594 20594 20594 20594 20594 20594 20594
Mot. Ed Fat. Ed. Fat. Mot. Texas Sch. Frac. Sch. Frac
<= HS <= HS College College Res SMART Pell
Discon. -0.00544 -0.00203 -0.0101 0.00731 -0.00271 0.00293 -0.00445
SE (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.00488) (0.00251) (0.00303)
N 20594 20594 20594 20594 20594 20571 20571
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Table 2.2: (cont.)
Covariates
2008/09-2010/11
Male Black Asian Hispanic Missing Missing Missing
Race Mot. Ed. Fat. Ed.
Discon. 0.00369 -0.000658 0.00367 -0.0158 0.00869 -0.00478 0.00529
SE (0.0177) (0.0115) (0.00948) (0.0148) (0.0111) (0.00891) (0.0108)
N 12242 12242 12242 12242 12242 12242 12242
Mot. Ed Fat. Ed. Fat. Mot. Texas Sch. Frac. Sch. Frac
<= HS <= HS College College Res SMART Pell
Discon. -0.00414 -0.000514 -0.00478 0.00892 -0.00546 0.00121 -0.00535
SE (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0178) (0.00636) (0.00328) (0.00383)
N 12242 12242 12242 12242 12242 12219 12219
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Table 2.2: (cont.)
BYU
Covariates
2006/07-2010/11
ACT Male White Black Miss. HS. Miss. Miss.
Score Pctile ACT Race
Discon. 0.305 -0.0236 0.0482* -0.00676 -0.00970 -0.00509 0.0155
SE (0.302) (0.0425) (0.0282) (0.00702) (0.0355) (0.0253) (0.0109)
N 2,332 2,332 2,332 2,332 2,332 2,332 2,332
Hispanic Asian HS SMART
Pctile Frac. Cour.
Discon. -0.0317* -0.0161 -0.00118 -0.00309
SE (0.0187) (0.0128) (0.0120) (0.0188)
N 2,332 2,332 2,332 2,332
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Table 2.2: (cont.)
Covariates
2008/09-2010/11
ACT Male White Black Miss. HS. Miss. Miss.
Score Pctile ACT Race
Discon. 0.326 -0.0527 0.0448 0.00268 0.0237 -0.00379 0.0307**
SE (0.415) (0.0566) (0.0373) (0.00941) (0.0469) (0.0322) (0.0125)
N 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,297
Hispanic Asian HS SMART
Pctile Frac. Cour.
Discon. -0.0279 -0.0161 -0.00353 0.0299
SE (0.0259) (0.0153) (0.0160) (0.0254)
N 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,297
Each column represents the estimated discontinuity in covariates at the EFC
threshold for SMART Grant eligibility. The discontinuity is estimated using local
linear regression and uses the optimal bandwidth.
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Table 2.3: SMART Grant Receipt
Texas
SMART Amount SMART Amount
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
Discontinuity 534.6*** 2.589 589.0*** -3.746
(97.96) (8.129) (120.2) (10.76)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
SMART Major Yes No Yes No
Observations 5780 24338 3491 14436
Ever SMART Ever SMART
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
Discontinuity 0.121*** 0.000709 0.129*** -0.00144
(0.0285) (0.00282) (0.0357) (0.00382)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
SMART Major Yes No Yes No
Observations 3180 13709 1920 8122
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Table 2.3: (cont.)
BYU
SMART Amount SMART Amount
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
Discontinuity 1467.9*** -71.15 1772.8*** -2.988
(313.1) (76.74) (381.3) (102.8)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
SMART Major Yes No Yes No
Observations 1273 3458 750 1848
Ever SMART Ever SMART
2006-07 to 2010-11 2008-09 to 2010-11
Discontinuity 0.418*** 0.00296 0.542*** 0.0164
(0.0761) (0.0217) (0.0958) (0.0302)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
SMART Major Yes No Yes No
Observations 654 1678 380 917
These regressions estimate the discontinuity in amount of SMART Grants dis-
bursed or probability of ever receiving a SMART Grant as a result of the EFC eli-
gibility discontinuity. The estimation is performed separately for SMART Majors
and non SMART Majors.
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Table 2.4: Effects on Major
Texas
Junior Major Senior Major
07-11 09-11 01-06 07-11 09-11 01-06
Discontinuity 0.0158 0.0327** 0.0173* 0.0133 0.0318** 0.0000240
(0.0110) (0.0143) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0135) (0.00954)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18746 11161 22004 18746 11161 22004
SMART Degree
07-11 09-11 01-06
Discontinuity -0.00211 0.00186 -0.00288
(0.00812) (0.00948) (0.00983)
School FE Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22422 13347 21852
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Table 2.4: (cont.)
BYU
Junior Major Senior Major
07-11 09-11 01-06 07-11 09-11 01-06
Discontinuity 0.0676* 0.102** 0.000395 0.0804** 0.101** 0.0182
(0.0365) (0.0493) (0.0258) (0.0350) (0.0468) (0.0258)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,332 1,297 4,219 2,332 1,297 4,219
SMART Degree Fraction SMART Jr Classes
07-11 09-11 01-06 07-11 09-11 01-06
Discontinuity 0.0479 0.0665* 0.0293 0.0207 0.0595* 0.00658
(0.0312) (0.0366) (0.0259) (0.0220) (0.0307) (0.0168)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,332 1,297 4,219 2,332 1,297 4,219
Fraction SMART Sr Classes
07-11 09-11 01-06
Discontinuity 0.0354 0.0774** -0.000300
(0.0262) (0.0365) (0.0188)
Observations 2,332 1,297 4,219
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Table 2.4: (cont.)
Regression Discontinuity Difference
Texas BYU
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Jr Major Sr Major Degree Jr Major Sr Major Degree
Later Discon. 0.0222 0.0409** 0.00399 0.0937* 0.0774 0.0342
(0.0181) (0.0171) (0.0151) (0.0526) (0.0519) (0.0497)
Discontinuity 0.00983 -0.00944 -0.0000911 0.000305 0.0187 0.0308
(0.0112) (0.0106) (0.00936) (0.0265) (0.0261) (0.0250)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29320 29320 29320 5516 5516 5516
These tables represent the effect income eligibility for a SMART Grant in a stu-
dent’s junior year on declared major, degrees granted, or fraction of courses taken.
Declared major is a 1 if declared in the relevant year and 0 otherwise (including
not being observed graduating or as a senior). The years listed are the last years
of the school year (e.g. 2007 is the 2006-07 school year. The regression disconti-
nuity difference estimator compares the discontinuity in 2008-09 to 2010-11 to the
discontinuity prior to 2006-07.
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Table 2.5: Yearly Discontinuities
Texas
Jr. Major
01 02-03 04-05 06-07 08-09 10-11 12
Discontinuity -0.00874 0.0158 0.000612 0.0230 0.000625 0.0382** -0.0203
(0.0227) (0.0166) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0164) (0.0247)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4493 8193 9114 9309 9162 8571 4054
Sr. Major
01 02-03 04-05 06-07 08-09 10-11 12
Discontinuity -0.0198 -0.0110 -0.0108 0.00559 -0.00274 0.0372** 0.0114
(0.0228) (0.0164) (0.0156) (0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0122)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4118 7515 8375 8577 8382 7874 3721
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Table 2.5: (cont.)
BYU
Sr. Major
02-03 04-05 06-07 08-09 10-11 12
Discontinuity -0.0200 0.0397 0.0480 0.0611 0.105* -0.0334
(0.0351) (0.0413) (0.0443) (0.0518) (0.0536) (0.0380)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,748 1,920 1,711 1,188 1,057 506
Sr. Major
02-03 04-05 06-07 08-09 10-11 12
Discontinuity -0.0357 0.00734 0.0627 0.0558 0.0963* -0.0297
(0.0350) (0.0418) (0.0438) (0.0538) (0.0574) (0.0822)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,748 1,920 1,711 1,188 1,057 506
These tables estimate the discontinuity separately for different groups of years.
The years listed are the last years of the school year (e.g. 2007 is the 2006-07 school
year.)
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Table 2.6: STEM and Language Outcomes
Texas
Jr Sr
STEM Language STEM Language
Discontinuity
0.0308** 0.00456* 0.0268* 0.00636**
(0.0147) (0.00277) (0.00317)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11161 11161 11161 11161
BYU
Jr Sr
STEM Language STEM Language
Discontinuity
0.105** -0.0157 0.0645 0.0189
(0.0528) (0.0221) (0.0138) (0.00317)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145
This table considers the effects separately STEM and Language majors. The years
used in estimation are 2008-09 to 2010-11. The discontinuity at the SMART Grant
EFC eligibility is presented.
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Table 2.7: Evans Replication
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STEM SMART Ever SMART SMART
Major Amount SMART Maj. Sr. Degree
Discontinuity 0.0407 87.44 0.0263* 0.0407 0.0216
(0.0274) (54.80) (0.0159) (0.0267) (0.0246)
Observations 3281 6736 3281 3281 3281
This table tries to replicate the sample conditions of Evans (2012) using the Texas
data. Data from before the 2010 school year is used and only students who entered
in 2006-07 or 2007-08 school year are included.
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Table 2.8: Bandwidth Sensitivity
Texas
Junior Major
Bandwidth 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1
Discontinuity 0.0464** 0.0470** 0.0447** 0.0362** 0.0350** 0.0324** 0.0230*
(0.0205) (0.0189) (0.0175) (0.0163) (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0140)
Observations 5641 6743 7802 8946 10030 11161 12242
Bandwidth 1.2 1.3 1.4 2 3
Discontinuity 0.0265** 0.0234* 0.0184 0.0132 0.0113
(0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0123) (0.0103) (0.00834)
Observations 13347 14498 15645 22421 34162
Senior Major
Bandwidth 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1
Discontinuity 0.0461** 0.0488** 0.0501*** 0.0402** 0.0375** 0.0331** 0.0237
(0.0222) (0.0203) (0.0189) (0.0175) (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0150)
Observations 4884 5817 6719 7698 8607 9591 10505
Bandwidth 1.2 1.3 1.4 2 3
Discontinuity 0.0273* 0.0235* 0.0205 0.0129* 0.0136*
(0.0144) (0.0138) (0.0132) (0.00735) (0.00780)
Observations 11457 12440 13430 37740 34162
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Table 2.8: (cont.)
BYU
Junior Major
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 2.1
Discontinuity 0.131** 0.132** 0.103* 0.113** 0.102** 0.102** 0.108**
(0.0575) (0.0552) (0.0541) (0.0528) (0.0504) (0.0493) (0.0480)
Observations 958 1,026 1,082 1,145 1,236 1,297 1,363
2.2 2.3 2.4 3 4
Discontinuity 0.112** 0.110** 0.105** 0.0971** 0.0550
(0.0466) (0.0455) (0.0445) (0.0394) (0.0339)
Observations 1,448 1,524 1,604 2082 2972
Senior Major
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 2.1
Discontinuity 0.147*** 0.124** 0.0857* 0.102** 0.0950** 0.101** 0.109**
(0.0546) (0.0527) (0.0517) (0.0502) (0.0479) (0.0468) (0.0457)
Observations 958 1,026 1,082 1,145 1,236 1,297 1,363
2.2 2.3 2.4 3 4
Discontinuity 0.109** 0.110** 0.0983** 0.0884** 0.0702**
(0.0442) (0.0433) (0.0424) (0.0346) (0.0325)
Observations 1,448 1,524 1,604 2519 2972
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Table 2.8: (cont.)
Texas
Jr Major–Quadratic
2.5 3 3.5 4
Discontinuity 0.0255* 0.0169 0.0110 0.0220**
(0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0116) (0.0109)
Observations 28351 34162 39933 46245
Sr Major-Quadratic
2.5 3 3.5 4
Discontinuity 0.0269** 0.0187 0.0146 0.0216**
(0.0128) (0.0117) (0.0108) (0.0101)
Observations 28351 34162 39933 46245
Degree Quadratic
Discontinuity 0.000317 -0.00195 -0.00276 0.00611
(0.00975) (0.00892) (0.00829) (0.00779)
Observations 28351 34162 39933 46245
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Table 2.8: (cont.)
BYU
Jr Major–Quadratic
2.5 3 3.5 4
Discontinuity 0.153** 0.125** 0.129** 0.143***
(0.0665) (0.0600) (0.0547) (0.0512)
Observations 1685 2082 2519 2972
Sr Major-Quadratic
2.5 3 3.5 4
Discontinuity 0.150** 0.126** 0.126** 0.136***
(0.0634) (0.0574) (0.0525) (0.0491)
Observations 1685 2082 2519 2972
Degree Quadratic
2.5 3 3.5 4
Discontinuity 0.105** 0.0975** 0.103** 0.0807**
(0.0499) (0.0455) (0.0418) (0.0394)
Observations 1685 2082 2519 2972
This table estimates the discontinuity by varying the bandwidth and using a
quadratic running variable allowed to vary on each side of the cutoff. Students
from 2008-09 to 2010-11 are used in estimation.
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Table 2.9: Heterogeneity By Sophomore Major
Jr SMART
Texas BYU
Soph. Non SMART 0.00392 -0.0127
(0.00681) (0.0383)
Soph. SMART Majors 0.0188 0.107
(0.0262) (0.0735)
Observations 17104 1771
Jr SMART
Below Median Soph. 0.0179
SMART Classes (0.0776)
Above Median Soph. 0.127
SMART Classes (0.0978)
Observations 1297
This table examines heterogeneity by sophomore major or class taking. The run-
ning variable and discontinuity are allowed to vary by sophomore major or class
taking. Students from 2008-09 to 2010-11 are used in estimation.
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Chapter 3
All Grown Up? The Effects of Financial Aid on
Enrolled Students
3.1 Introduction
Attending college can have large impacts on students’ earnings as well as
many other dimensions of students’ life (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011; Zimmer-
man, 2014; Hoekstra, 2009). Moreover, students who complete college have substan-
tially higher wages than those who do not (Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013).
Because college attendance and completion can have such large impacts, under-
standing how students make decisions about college becomes critical. This paper
explores explore how students who have already enrolled in college are affected
by additional financial resources. I will consider how students’ persistence, credits
attempted, and graduation is affected by financial aid.
The price of college has been shown to affect student enrollment in numer-
ous studies (Deming and Dynarski, 2009). The primary focus of these studies has
been students deciding to enroll in college for the first time. However, far fewer
studies have examined how financial aid made available to students while in col-
lege affects student decisions.1 While enrolling in college is a key step in the pro-
1These studies will be discussed in detail in section 3.2.
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cess of human capital acquisition, completing college predicts additional earnings
gains over simply attending. College enrollment rates have grown since 1970 but
college completion rates have stagnated (Turner, 2004). Financial aid could play
a key role in student graduation and this paper will examine the role it plays for
older students.
To examine the effect of financial aid for already-enrolled students, I ex-
amine changes in the dependent status of students. Financial independence from
parents can induce large changes in federal financial aid such as Pell Grants and
federal subsidized loans. This paper first documents the changes in financial aid
that occurs with financial independence and then links changes in financial aid to
changes in student outcomes. Financial independence will be shown to have het-
erogeneous impacts on student financial aid outcomes depending on the income
of the students’ family as well as the type of institution the student is attending.
I leverage Texas administrative data from 2002-03 to 2013-14 to examine these ef-
fects separately for university and community college students.2 I also consider
heterogeneity by student family income as measured by Pell receipt in the prior
year. Ultimately, I find that sizable changes in financial aid have small impacts on
student outcomes in college.
Older students constitute a large fraction of the college going population
and will be the focus of this study. In the nationally representative 2012 National
Postsecondary Aid Survey, 51.3% of all undergraduate students were classified as
2Community college and four year students differ along many dimensions, including age and
price responsiveness (Denning, 2015)
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independents and 43.8% were 24 years or older (U.S. Department of Education,
2013). Not only are older students a large part of the college going population,
they are an increasing share. In 1970 students 25 and older constituted 27.7% of all
undergraduate enrollment and by 2010 they accounted for 42.6% (National Center
for Education Statistics, 2014). Since 1990, over 40% of students enrolled as under-
graduates were 25 years old or older. This study sheds new insight into this large
group of older students and how the federal financial aid system affects them.
The primary changes observed in financial aid in this study will be on fed-
eral financial aid. Federal financial aid is substantial with over $171 billion dis-
bursed in 2012-13 of which $33 billion was allocated to Pell Grants (CollegeBoard,
2014). Independent students made up nearly 60% of Pell Grant recipients in 2010-
11. (Department of Education, 2013). Despite the majority of Pell recipients being
independent, very little is known about the consequences of classifying students
as independent or the effect of additional grant aid on already-enrolled students.
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. It exam-
ines the effect of additional financial aid for existing students on outcomes such as
persistence, credit taking, and graduation. Second, it considers the effect of need-
based aid on student outcomes for older students who are increasingly important
in higher education. Lastly, it is the first study of which I am aware to document
the empirical changes in federal financial aid occurring when students become in-
dependent.
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3.2 Conceptual Framework
Reducing the price of college is politically popular and has been considered
in various forms.3 One of the potential benefits of reducing the price of college is af-
fecting students who are already enrolled but now are paying less to go to college.
Reducing the price of college may affect student’s number of credits attempted, the
probability of reenrollment, and graduation among other things. This study will
examine whether increased financial aid affects inframarginal students and their
college decisions. Understanding the effect of financial aid on already-enrolled
students is critical for understanding the entire effect of financial aid policy.
Persistence
Several studies have focused on the effect of price on initial enrollment in
college but far fewer have examined the effect of grants on student persistence.4
The studies that have considered reenrollment have found that additional grants
increase reenrollment for some groups of students (Goldrick-Rab et al., 2011; Bet-
tinger, 2004; Castleman and Long, 2013). These studies have focused on recent
high school graduates or first year students while the present will focus on older
students. The current study also examines a one time increase rather than changes
3 Hansen (1983) and Kane (1995) examine changes in enrollment as a result of the implementa-
tion of the Pell grant but do not consider graduation or persistence. Both studies do not find any
evidence that college enrollment increased as a result of the grant. In contrast, Seftor and Turner
(2002) finds that older students did respond to the implementation of the Pell Grant by increas-
ing enrollment. Other studies have examined the effect of grants on post-enrollment behavior but
they often focus on merit-based grants with specific incentives (Scott-Clayton, 2011; Cornwell et al.,
2005; Cohodes and Goodman, 2014; Denning and Turley, 2015).
4See Deming and Dynarski (2009) for a summary of the research on financial aid.
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in financial aid that increase in every year the student is enrolled. In contrast to Bet-
tinger (2004), this study also examines graduation outcomes and credits attempted
to further understand the effects of need-based aid and the mechanisms through
which it works.
Course Taking
Additional need-based grant aid may affect student course taking in several
ways. Grants could act as a substitute for working during college and as such stu-
dents might devote more time to their studies. Increased time focused on studies
would allow students to progress through college more quickly. If grant aid dis-
places parental aid there is no clear impact on a student’s decision to take courses.
Grant aid may also decrease credit hours taken in a semester or increase time spent
in college if there is consumption value to time in college (Jacob et al., 2013). Ul-
timately the impact on course taking is ambiguous. Overall, there is no strong
prediction for the effect of grant aid on course taking.
Graduation
Students may respond to changing college price by adjusting the time it
takes to graduate. Garibaldi et al. (2012) shows that at a university in Italy students
speed up graduation when college is more expensive in the next year. The present
study uses a similar increase in the cost of continuing college in the United States
to examine reenrollment and graduation behavior. Though the present work con-
siders changes in financial independence and financial aid as opposed to changes
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in tuition, both of these papers examine changes in the net cost of college.5
3.2.1 Financial Independence
Seftor and Turner (2002) examine the effect of financial independence on
student enrollment and finds that financial independence increases student enroll-
ment. The present study also studies financial independence and focuses on out-
comes beyond enrollment and precisely measures both the change in aid and stu-
dent outcomes as a result of detailed administrative data. Seftor and Turner (2002)
use a differences-in-differences framework to examine the impact of the change the
age at which students were classified as independent. The relevant policy changes
were most likely to affect single heads of households and so they focus on single
students with married heads of households as controls. They also focus on stu-
dents who they predict would lose eligibility under the new rules. They find that
decreased access to federal financial aid significantly decreased college enrollment
of older students using CPS data. Their findings suggest that federal financial aid
policy determining independence can have large effects. One potential shortcom-
ing of their paper is that the result may be driven by different trends in enrollment
for the groups they expect to be affected. Additionally, they use uses one change
in policy which may lead to a biased estimate, particularly if other changes oc-
5Another approach that examines the impact of types of financial aid on outcomes has been
to use hazard models to estimate the effect of type of student aid on persistence and graduation.
these studies generally find that the type of student aid matters for persistence and graduation
(DesJardins et al., 2002; Glocker, 2011).
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cur contemporaneously. (Conley and Taber, 2011).6 The present studies examines
similar issues but uses a different source of variation–exact birth date.
3.3 Background
Financial Independence The federal government has several financial programs
that are designed to help students pay for college. The first set of programs is
administered by the U.S. Department of Education which I will refer to as “federal
financial aid.” The second is a part of the United States Tax Code and I will refer
to it as “tax aid”. I will discuss these programs in the following section and how
financial independence impacts aid receipt from both sources.
3.3.1 Federal Financial Aid
Federal financial aid consists of the federal grants, student loans, and work
study. The largest federal grant program is the Pell Grant which is targeted toward
low income students. In the 2013 fiscal year the Pell Grant cost over $33 billion
and provided aid to over 9 million students. Various federal student loans are also
available to students and low-income students may take out loans at subsidized
interest rates. In order to be eligible for need-based financial aid students must file
a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).
The FAFSA uses information about student income and assets as well as
family income and assets and demographic information (such as the number of
6Seftor and Turner (2002) also examine the effect on students ages 21 to 23 where the present
study focuses on students ages 23 and 24.
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siblings in college) to compute an Expected Family Contribution (EFC).7 This EFC
determines eligibility for need-based federal programs with lower values leading
to eligibility for more grants and subsidized loans. In general, the federal financial
aid awards are calculated yearly. If a life event occurs that would change a stu-
dent’s EFC, students can amend their FAFSA to reflect the new information and
possibly change their eligibility for Pell Grants. During the period studied, stu-
dents could receive the Pell Grant for up to 18 semesters.
Students must include parent information on their FAFSA as long as they
are considered dependent. Undergraduate students may be classified as indepen-
dents for several reasons including being over 24 years old as of January 1st of the
school year, being married, having dependent children, or for a few other reasons.8
When students are independent, parental financial information is not considered
and student aid edibility increases as a result. All else equal, independent students
qualify for larger grant awards than dependent students. Independent students
also qualify for larger amounts of government loans on average.9
Independent status is determined once per year. Students who are 24 or
older as of January 1st will be independent for the entire school year. Students
who are 23 years and 364 days old and younger that meet the other conditions for
dependent status will be declared dependent for the entire year. This discontinu-
7Bettinger et al. (2012) examine the complexity of the FAFSA’s effect on student filing and en-
rollment
8See http://studentaid.ed.gov/fafsa/filling-out/dependency for all conditions that determine
independent status.
9Parents may longer be qualified for certain loans like parent PLUS loans–a more complete
examination of these loans will be considered in future drafts.
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ity creates a situation where students are very similar in age but are treated very
differently in terms of their eligibility for federal financial aid.
3.3.2 Tax Aid
The United States Tax Code gives special treatment to dependent children.
Children can be claimed as dependents as long as they are younger than 19 at the
end of the year. If a child is a full time student they may be claimed as a dependent
from if they are younger than 24 at the end of the year and meet certain condi-
tions. Those conditions are that the child must be a full time student for at least 5
months in a year, they must live with their parents for at least 6 months of the year,
and must receive more than half of their financial support from their parents. If
these conditions are met parents may claim their student children as dependents
and receive exemptions and tax credits that reduce taxable income. Additionally,
dependent students may qualify the taxpayer for tax credits like the American Op-
portunity Credit, the Lifetime Learning Credit, and the Earned Income Tax Credit.
During the time period studied the Hope Tax Credit and Tuition Deduction could
also be used. For an extremely thorough treatment of the effect of tax credits on
college enrollment see Bulman and Hoxby (2015) who conclude that tax credits for
college have essentially no effect on student enrollment patterns.
Tax aid will change at the same January 1st threshold for some students. In
particular, students who are living at home for at least 6 months and providing
less than half of their support, tax filing status is likely to have changed for stu-
dents turning 24 before January 1st. The number of enrolled students living with
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their parents during the school year is available using the ACS from 2005-2011. In
Texas, 42.16% of students in the cohort that turns 24 during the school year are
living with their parents. This number is an upper bound on the number of stu-
dents affected by the change in tax status as some of those who live at home may
receive less than half of their support from their parents. Unfortunately the ACS
does not have information whether students are attending a four year or two year
college. However, the 2007-2008 National Post Secondary Aid Survey (NPSAS)
contains information about residence with parents for students while they are en-
rolled. Students at four year schools in Texas who are from 24 to 24.3 on January
1st live with their parents 15.9% of the time while two year students are more than
twice as likely with 35.7% living with their parents while enrolled (U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, 2013). The fraction of students with a change in tax status is no
more than 42% is likely to be smaller at four year schools than at two year schools.
If a student is declared independent, all else equal, a the parent’s tax liability
will increase as they no longer can claim a dependent exemption or any of the
education tax credits. If parents were eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit,
as the number of eligible children will be reduced. The student will have their
personal tax liability decrease as they will be able to use the education tax credits
on their tax return instead of parents using the education tax credits. In general
the family’s total tax liability will increase as credits and/or deductions are shifted
from parents with relatively high marginal tax rates to students with relatively low
marginal tax rates.10
10For very high income families who are not eligible for education tax credits, the total tax burden
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Financial independence is associated with fewer family resources but in-
creased student resources. How this affects total resources toward college de-
pends on how parents and older students split changes in wealth from marginal
tax changes. I am not aware of any studies that examine how families split such
tax changes and data on within-family transfers would be required to answer the
question. Tax aid is never “disbursed” per se and households may differ in the
timing of realizing tax benefits. Tax aid is generally realized at the time of tax fil-
ing/tax returns which happens at some time in the second half of the school year.
Tax aid is likely to be of lesser impact than financial aid because it is disbursed
after many of the costs of attending college occur.
Overall, tax credits for college will have changed for a minority of students
enrolled. Moreover, tax credits for college have been shown to not have any effect
on enrollment in Bulman and Hoxby (2015). For these reasons, the reduced form
effect of financial independence is likely to be largely driven by changes in federal
financial aid rather than changes in tax aid. This is particularly true at four year
schools where students are not living with their parents as often. For this reason,
interpreting the effects of financial independence in this paper will focus on the
effects on federal financial aid. Future work will carefully identify which students
were most likely to be affected by changes in tax aid and will estimate the effect of
financial independence separately for these students.
may decrease.
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3.4 Data
The data for this project comes from the Texas Higher Education Coordi-
nating Board and contain the universe of students who were enrolled in public
colleges and universities in the state of Texas from 2002-03 to 2012-13. The data
contain demographic information about the students including race, gender, and
birth date. They also contain records on student enrollment and credits attempted.
Importantly, all financial aid disbursed by the university is also contained in the
data. Additionally, many of the fields from the Free Application for Student Aid
(FAFSA) are available including including dependency status and in later years,
parent and student Adjusted Gross Income.
The data is restricted to students with a valid Social Security Number (for
matching purposes) and information is matched across the various files and years
to create the variables of interest. All variables created deal with a academic year
which starts in the fall of one year and extends through the end of summer of the
next. The following variables are created:
Enrolled Next Fall (Community College/4yr) A dichotomous variable in-
dicating that students appear in the data enrolled at a community college or
university in the next year
Graduated In X Years Indicates that a student received a degree this year
or the next.
Credits Attempted The total number of credit hours attempted in the school
year.
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Loans Includes all federal loans the student takes out.
Table 3.1 contains summary statistics. The sample is split by whether the
23 year old student was attending a university or community college (with stu-
dents attending both omitted) and by whether the student received a Pell Grant
in the year they turned 23. I will consider the effect of financial independence
separately for these four groups of students. Community college and four year
students will be considered separately because the experiences of these students
are quite different.11 Students who received Pell Grants in the year they turned
23 will be considered separately from students who did not receive Pell Grants.
Students who did not receive a Pell Grant in the year they were 23 experienced a
substantially larger change in the amount of grants received as a result of financial
independence. This heterogeneity in the impact of financial independence yields
insights into the effect of increased grants on educational outcomes.
Some notable features of the data are apparent in the summary statistics.
Pell students are more likely to be racial minorities than non Pell students. Addi-
tionally, community college students are more likely to be racial minorities than
university students. Approximately 50% of students reenroll in the next year. Also
students who receive a Pell Grant as 23 year olds have higher amounts of grants
and loans in the next year.
11See Kane and Rouse (1999) for an overview of community colleges.
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3.5 Identification
As previously discussed, students who are 23 years old at the end of the
year are counted as dependent for the entire previous year if they meet other con-
ditions. However, students who are 24 at the end of the year are dependent for
the prior year. This rule means that students who are nearly identical in age are
treated differently for financial aid and tax purposes for an entire year. I leverage
the discrete nature of the change in classification to examine the effect of additional
financial aid arising from being declared independent on student outcomes using
a regression discontinuity framework.
The sample will consist of students who are attending a public college or
university in Texas in the year that they turn 23. The outcomes considered will
be in the next year and include reenrollment, graduation, credits attempted, and
financial aid. Outcomes in the next year will be considered because students in the
year they turn 23 will not have experienced different financial aid or tax treatment
as a result of their age. However, in the year students turn 24, there may be enroll-
ment responses to financial independence and so the sample may be changing in
response to differential incentives.
The estimating equation becomes:
Yit = f(a˜geit) + θ · 1(Ind > 0) +Xit + µt + it, for |a˜gei| < j (3.1)
Where i indexes students and t indexes school year. Yits is a student out-
come like enrollment, credits attempted, or graduation, f(a˜geit) is a flexible func-
tion of a student’s age as of January 1st, θ is the parameter of interest and is the
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effect of the additional financial aid arising from students being declared finan-
cially independent in the next year. Xit contains control variables like race and
gender and µt are year fixed effects. Finally, it is an idiosyncratic error term. This
equation is estimated on a subset of the data to compare students who are similar
ages and in the preferred, local linear specification j is chosen using the procedure
outlined in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). This equation will be estimated sep-
arately for students at community colleges and universities and by whether they
received a Pell Grant during the year they turned 23.
Assumptions for Identification
In any regression discontinuity estimation several assumptions are made in
order to assure that the estimates obtained reflect the effect of treatment. The first
is that the running variable, in this case birth date, cannot be manipulated to gain
access to treatment. Obviously a student’s true birth date is not manipulable by
the student before or after birth. Students do have incentives to misreport their
birth date to gain additional dollars but the reported birth date is verified by com-
parison with Social Security Administration records. In this sense, birth date is
an ideal running variable because it is not determined by the student and is not
misreported.
However, there is evidence that birth dates are manipulated in response to
tax incentives (Schulkind and Shapiro, 2014; LaLumia et al., ming). These studies
found that there is a small amount of manipulation in response to tax incentives
that is less than half the amount of re-timing of births that is typically seen on a
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weekend. A $1,000 change in taxes leads to about 1% of births being re-timed.12
This may be a concern for identification if children of parents who re-time their
births in response to tax incentives produce children who systematically respond
differently to financial independence 24 years later. It is not obvious how these
students would differ systematically but it is a possibility.
To explore the amount of re-timing of births that occurs Panels A and B
of Figures 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, and 3.7 plot the number of students with each birthday
among students turning 23 in a given school year. The panels on the left (A) in-
clude all students and there are additional students born just before January 1st as
has been documented elsewhere. Panels on the right remove students who were
born within four days of January 1st and the distribution is much more smooth
through the cutoff. There is some re-timing evident for university students who
are not receiving a Pell grant around Christmas but otherwise the distributions
appear to be smooth after omitting 4 days on either side of January 1st.
Because the manipulation is likely to be small and is done for reasons un-
related to gaining access to independent status, the preferred specification uses
students close to the cutoff. However, as a robustness check a regression discon-
tinuity donut estimator is used where born within four days of January 1st are
excluded. This excludes students whose births were re-timed (up to 4 days) for tax
purposes. These results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar and are
available upon request.
12Schulkind and Shapiro (2014) find that the manipulation is due to increased cesarean rates
before January 1.
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Another assumption of the regression discontinuity estimator is that stu-
dents on one side of the cutoff are similar to students on the other side in ob-
servable and unobservable ways.13 I test for observable differences by looking
for discontinuities in predetermined characteristics like race and gender to test the
plausibility of this assumption. Results from these checks for balance of the covari-
ates are found in Panel A of Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. In these regressions there
are 24 discontinuities considered and no estimates are statistically significant at the
5% level. However, there are two estimates for students who received Pell in the
year they turn 23 that are significant at the 10% level. This number of marginally
statistically significant results is roughly what would be expected by chance given
that 24 coefficients are being considered. Overall, there is strong evidence student
characteristics are not discretely changing at the threshold for eligibility.
Given that students are unable to manipulate their date of birth and that ob-
served covariates do not vary discretely by eligibility status, the testable assump-
tions of the regression discontinuity estimator are met and the following results
can be interpreted as causal.
13There may be unobserved variables that also differ on each side of the age cutoff. One example
that may be relevant is insurance coverage. In the state of Texas during this employers were re-
quired to cover dependent children on health for health insurance until age 25 so insurance status
is not likely to vary discretely at this threshold (Dillender, 2014). For 2011 and 2012, the Affordable
Care Act mandated that all children under the age of 26 be eligible for inclusion on their parent’s
plans which would not affect the identification strategy of this paper.
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3.6 Results
The results will proceed by first characterizing the effect of financial inde-
pendence on student financial aid received. As previously mentioned, the effect of
financial independence depends on the student’s family characteristics as well as
the institution attended. For this reason the results will be considered separately
for four groups. The first division compares university to community college stu-
dents. The second compares students who received a Pell Grant in the year they
turned 23 to students who did not. The effects on financial aid are quite differ-
ent for these groups of students. The effects on educational outcomes will then be
discussed and linked to changes in financial aid. Ultimately all four groups will a
similar story of very small impacts of financial independence on student outcomes.
3.6.1 University Students, No Pell when 23
The regression results for students at four year institutions who did not re-
ceive a Pell Grant appear in Table 3.2 which corresponds to Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
Panel A of Table 3.2 shows that observed student covariates do not vary discretely
at the cutoff. Panel B characterizes the change in financial outcomes for students.
Each of the columns is a different financial outcome in the next year and the esti-
mates represent the discontinuity in the outcome for 23 year old students. Figure
3.1 presents some of these results visually. Students who enroll in the next year and
are declared financially independent receive $837 additional dollars in Pell Grants
and $934 dollars in all grants. If enrollment in the next year is related to additional
grant money, then these estimates are likely to be biased upwards. Reenrollment
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rates will be shown to be insensitive to the change in dependent status and so
these estimates are likely to be minimally biased. For a more cautious estimate,
students who do not enroll in the next year are included in the estimation and the
discontinuities are slightly smaller at $419 and $469 respectively. Federal student
loans also increase by $313 among enrolled students and $177 if all students are
included. These results suggest that there is a large discontinuity in grant aid of
nearly $1,000 for students who enroll in the next year.
Student outcomes are considered in Panel C of the Table and students are
no more likely to reenroll in the next year. The point estimate for reenrollment at
universities is .4 percentage points and the top of the 95% confidence interval is 1.3
percentage points. These results suggest that an additional $1,000 does not have
large reenrollment effects for this group of students.
Student graduation may be affected by additional grant money. Students
who expect to pay relatively less in the next year may decide to wait an additional
year to graduate as in Garibaldi et al. (2012). This is explored in columns 6 where
graduation this year is considered. If the additional money is expected and slows
graduation plans, then eligible students would be less likely to graduate in the cur-
rent year. The point estimate is very small at -.2 percentage points and statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Students do not seem to respond to changes in prices
for the next school year by adjusting their graduation. This may be because they
are not anticipated or because graduation is insensitive to price changes. Similarly
there is no effect on graduation in the next year as seen in column 7. Students in
this year actually do receive additional grant money of nearly $1,000 for enrolled
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students but the increased financial aid does not change the graduation probabil-
ity.
The last student outcome to be considered is the total number of credits
attempted in the next year. This is in column 1 and is shown to increase by .28
credits. Because students have not changed their enrollment probability, this in-
crease represents a change in credits attempted for inframarginal students. An
additional $1,000 of aid increases credits attempted by .6. This modest increase
in credits attempted is the only educational outcome that seems to be affected for
students who experience a change in dependent status.
Several lessons emerge from university students who did not receive a Pell
Grant when 23. Financial independence and the associated increases in grants
($976) and federal loans ($313) does not affect reenrollment or graduation proba-
bilities. If financial independence is not well understood than students may not
change reenrollment rates or graduation in the year they turn 23. However, even
after enrolled students actually receive the additional financial support, there is no
change in graduation probabilities and a very small change in the number of cred-
its attempted. Unconditional grant money and additional federal student loans
do not seem to effect reenrollment or graduation and have small effects on credits
attempted for this group of students.
3.6.2 University Students, Pell when 23
University students who received a Pell Grant when 23 are considered in
Table 3.3 and Figures 3.3 and 3.4. University students who received a Pell Grant
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when 23 receive larger amounts of grant aid in the next year than students who
did not receive Pell Grants when 23. This is to be expected as financial need across
school years is very persistent. However, the measured discontinuity for indepen-
dent students is significantly smaller than for students who did not receive Pell
Grants. This is likely because Pell Grant students’ parents have lower incomes
and so excluding them from the calculation of federal financial aid does not have
as large an impact. Among enrolled students Pell Grants increase $259 at the age
threshold, federal loans increase by $749 and all grants increase by $312. If stu-
dents who do not enroll are included those estimates are reduced by roughly half.
Despite a lower discontinuity in grant aid, these students’ discontinuity in loans is
twice as large as students who did not receive a Pell Grant at age 23. This suggests
that poorer students have higher demand for federal loans than richer students.
Unfortunately the data do not contain information on non federal loans and so it
is not clear if this is displacing private loans or if it represents new borrowing.
Panel C of Table 3.3 examines educational outcomes. The general finding is
that enrollment in the next year is unaffected by the additional grants and loans.
Credits attempted is also not affected. However, graduation in the year that the
students receive the additional grants and loans they are 1.6 percentage points
more likely to graduate. This is somewhat puzzling because there is no change
in credits attempted. However, the additional grants and federal loans could help
with student performance in classes and thus help students receive credits and
graduate.
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3.6.3 Community College Students, No Pell When 23
Community college students who did not receive a Pell Grant when 23 are
considered in Table 3.4 and in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. Panel B of Table 3.4 estimates
the changes in financial aid received. The discontinuity for students who enroll
in the next year is $288 in Pell Grants, $329 in all grants, and $156 in loans. The
discontinuities for community college students are significantly smaller than for
university students14. When considering unconditional aid to avoid issues with
differential enrollment, the the amounts are reduced by about one third.
Panel C shows that educational outcomes were largely unaffected by the
change in financial aid. There estimates of the discontinuities in reenrollment and
graduation are very close to zero and are not statistically different. There is an
increase in the number of credits attempted with .369 more credits attempted as
a result of financial independence. This happens despite there being no change
in enrollment suggesting that the additional money induced additional classes at-
tempted on the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin. With the (ten-
uous) assumption that all of the change in class taking is due to increased grants,
these estimates imply a 1.82 credit hour increase for a $1,000 increase in grants.
This is about three times as high as the similar estimates for students who did not
receive a Pell Grant when 23 years old at universities.
14This could be due to lower rates of FAFSA completion
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3.6.4 Community College Students, Pell when 23
Community college students who received a Pell Grant when 23 years old
are considered in Table 3.5 and in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Panel B documents the
change in financial aid in the next year and finds that there were largely no changes
in financial aid received. The exception is that there may have been modest in-
creases in federal loans accrued though this estimate is marginally statistically sig-
nificant. Unsurprisingly, there are also no changes in educational outcomes as seen
in Panel C where graduation, enrollment, and credits attempted are insensitive to
changes in financial dependency status.
Community college students who received a Pell Grant at age 23 may not
have had any discontinuity because their parents may not have made enough
money to factor into grant calculations. Whatever the reasons, it is reassuring that
there is no change in student outcomes when there is no change in financial out-
comes. In some ways the estimates for this group of students can be seen as a
placebo test to explore if their are inherent changes in educational outcomes for
students across this birth date threshold.
3.7 Conclusion
Financial independence increases financial aid to students. These increases
can be quite large. For four year students not receiving a Pell Grant in the previous
year the change is substantial with an increase in grants of nearly $1000. Despite
this sharp change in financial aid, educational outcomes do not seem to be affected.
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For students who did not receive a Pell grant in the year they turn 23, financial in-
dependence increased credit taking by small amounts at both community colleges
and universities. Interestingly, community college students responded to smaller
changes in financial aid with larger increases in credit taking. These results taken
together suggest that grant money is not likely to affect graduation or credit taking
for higher income students.
For poorer students, the change in financial aid associated with financial
independence is smaller than for richer students. Students who had previously
received Pell Grants at universities do increase the federal loans they take out in
addition and see increases in grant money. These changes lead to faster gradu-
ation. This suggests that additional financial aid for low-income, older students
students may increase graduation rates.
Taking all the evidence together, financial independence increases finan-
cial aid received–particularly for wealthier students. This has modest impacts on
credits attempted for wealthier students. However, for poorer students, financial
independence has a smaller change on grants but increases federal loan utilization
and can affect graduation rates for students.
Given the modest impacts on educational outcomes policymakers may want
to reconsider how financial aid for students over 24 is determined. There are
large changes in financial aid without accompanying large changes in student out-
comes. The results of this study suggest that raising the age of financial indepen-
dence would not affect student reenrollment and would also not change credits
attempted or graduation substantially.
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3.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: University Students–No Pell This Year, Density and Financial
(a) Density (b) Density Donut
(c) Total Grants Among Enrolled (d) Federal Loans
Panels A and B plot the number of students in the sample born on each day of the
year. Panel B excludes students born within 4 days of January 1st. Panel C presents
the total grants received by students in the next year among students who enrolled.
Panel D presents the amount of federal loans taken out by the students with stu-
dents not enrolling being coded as zero. In panels C and D each dot represents
the average financial aid for students in a six day bin and the size of the dot is
proportional to the number of students used to compute the average.
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Figure 3.2: University Students–No Pell This Year, Educational Outcomes
(a) reenroll (b) Hours Attempted
(c) Graduate This Year, 4yr (d) Graduate Next Year, 4yr
These panels present student educational outcomes by birth date. Each dot repre-
sents the average financial aid for students in a six day bin and the size of the dot
is proportional to the number of students used to compute the average.
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Figure 3.3: University Students–Pell This Year, Density and Financial
(a) Density (b) Density Donut
(c) Total Grants Among Enrolled (d) Federal Loans
Panels A and B plot the number of students in the sample born on each day of the
year. Panel B excludes students born within 4 days of January 1st. Panel C presents
the total grants received by students in the next year among students who enrolled.
Panel D presents the amount of federal loans taken out by the students with stu-
dents not enrolling being coded as zero. In panels C and D each dot represents
the average financial aid for students in a six day bin and the size of the dot is
proportional to the number of students used to compute the average.
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Figure 3.4: University Students-Pell This Year, Educational Outcomes
(a) reenroll, 4yr→ 4yr (b) Hours Attempted
(c) Graduate This Year, 4yr (d) Graduate Next Year, 4yr
These panels present student educational outcomes by birth date. Each dot repre-
sents the average financial aid for students in a six day bin and the size of the dot
is proportional to the number of students used to compute the average.
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Figure 3.5: Community College Students–No Pell This Year, Density and Financial
(a) Density (b) Density Donut
(c) Total Grants Among Enrolled (d) Federal Loans
Panels A and B plot the number of students in the sample born on each day of the
year. Panel B excludes students born within 4 days of January 1st. Panel C presents
the total grants received by students in the next year among students who enrolled.
Panel D presents the amount of federal loans taken out by the students with stu-
dents not enrolling being coded as zero. In panels C and D each dot represents
the average financial aid for students in a six day bin and the size of the dot is
proportional to the number of students used to compute the average.
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Figure 3.6: Community College Students–No Pell This Year, Educational Out-
comes
(a) Reenroll (b) Hours Attempted
(c) Graduate This Year, 2yr (d) Graduate Next Year, 2yr
These panels present student educational outcomes by birth date. Each dot repre-
sents the average financial aid for students in a six day bin and the size of the dot
is proportional to the number of students used to compute the average.
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Figure 3.7: Community College Students–Pell This Year, Density and Financial
(a) Density (b) Density Donut
(c) Total Grants Among Enrolled (d) Federal Loans
Panels A and B plot the number of students in the sample born on each day of the
year. Panel B excludes students born within 4 days of January 1st. Panel C presents
the total grants received by students in the next year among students who enrolled.
Panel D presents the amount of federal loans taken out by the students with stu-
dents not enrolling being coded as zero. In panels C and D each dot represents
the average financial aid for students in a six day bin and the size of the dot is
proportional to the number of students used to compute the average.
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Figure 3.8: Community College Students–Pell This Year, Educational Outcomes
(a) Reenroll (b) Hours Attempted
(c) Graduate This Year, 2yr (d) Graduate Next Year, 2yr
These panels present student educational outcomes by birth date. Each dot repre-
sents the average financial aid for students in a six day bin and the size of the dot
is proportional to the number of students used to compute the average.
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Table 3.1: Summary Stats, by Enrollment/Pell Receipt in Year Turning 23
No Pell, CC No Pell, 4yr
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Pell 194994 0.00 0.00 192009 0.00 0.00
White 194994 0.35 0.48 192009 0.47 0.50
Black 194994 0.09 0.28 192009 0.07 0.25
Asian 194994 0.03 0.18 192009 0.04 0.19
Hispanic 194994 0.22 0.41 192009 0.13 0.33
Male 194994 0.49 0.50 192009 0.52 0.50
Next Year Enr CC Only 194994 0.49 0.50 192009 0.02 0.15
Next Year Enr 4yr Only 194994 0.04 0.20 192009 0.40 0.49
Next Year Enr Both 194994 0.04 0.20 192009 0.03 0.18
Next Year Pell (Unc.) 194994 259.48 965.56 192009 304.33 1055.40
Next Year Tot. Grants (Unc.) 194994 308.54 1106.38 192009 397.68 1280.05
Next Year Hours Att. (Unc.) 194994 8.94 10.63 192009 9.55 12.54
Next Year Loans (Unc.) 194994 607.19 2652.88 192009 1751.85 4405.42
Next Year Loans (Enr) 114280 1036.05 3400.61 95841 3509.67 5719.48
Next Year Pell (Enr.) 114280 442.75 1228.68 95841 609.69 1430.16
Next Year Total Grants (Enr.) 114280 526.45 1404.96 95841 796.71 1721.84
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Table 3.1: (cont.)
Pell, CC Pell, 4yr
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Pell 83506 1.00 0.00 76708 1.00 0.00
White 83506 0.20 0.40 76708 0.20 0.40
Black 83506 0.19 0.39 76708 0.21 0.41
Asian 83506 0.02 0.14 76708 0.05 0.21
Hispanic 83506 0.28 0.45 76708 0.25 0.43
Male 83506 0.32 0.47 76708 0.43 0.49
Next Year Enr CC Only 83506 0.52 0.50 76708 0.02 0.16
Next Year Enr 4yr Only 83506 0.04 0.20 76708 0.50 0.50
Next Year Enr Both 83506 0.04 0.19 76708 0.04 0.20
Next Year Pell (Unc.) 83506 1621.56 1989.56 76708 1597.56 2047.19
Next Year Tot. Grants (Unc.) 83506 1788.29 2232.61 76708 2001.42 2610.06
Next Year Hours Att. (Unc.) 83506 10.77 11.35 76708 12.23 13.13
Next Year Loans (Unc.) 83506 1172.95 2834.51 76708 3574.35 5107.01
Next Year Loans (Enr) 52696 1858.74 3384.87 47755 5741.42 5427.00
Next Year Pell (Enr.) 52696 2569.65 1958.68 47755 2566.13 2060.69
Next Year Total Grants (Enr.) 52696 2833.85 2221.69 47755 3214.85 2653.61
This table presents summary statistics for the data split by student pell receipt
in the year they turn 23 and institution type. Data come from the Texas Higher
Education Coordinating Board and include students from 2002-03 to 2012-13.
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Table 3.2: University Students, No Pell This Year
A. Covar. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male White Black Hispanic Asian Cal. Year
Disc. -0.00761 0.00294 0.000853 -0.000228 0.000661 0.0188
(0.00506) (0.00505) (0.00259) (0.00340) (0.00195) (0.0319)
N. 158926 158926 158926 158926 158926 158926
B. Fin. Pell Loans All Grants Loans Pell All Grants
Outcomes (Enr.) (Enr.) (Enr.) (Uncond.) (Uncond.) (Uncond.)
Disc. 837.0*** 313.1*** 934.0*** 176.8*** 419.4*** 469.2***
(17.60) (73.81) (21.39) (40.41) (9.476) (11.54)
N 95841 95841 95841 192009 192009 192009
C. Educ. Next Tot Enr Enr Grad CC Grad CC Grad 4yr Grad 4yr
Outcomes Hours CC 4yr in 0y in 1y in 0y in 1y
Disc. 0.283** 0.000301 0.00451 -0.000428 -0.000107 -0.00209 0.000494
(0.115) (0.00138) (0.00451) (0.000739) (0.00110) (0.00522) (0.00505)
N 192009 192009 192009 111603 111603 143841 143841
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
This table considers outcomes for students who were enrolled in a university in
the year they turned 23. Panel A checks for balance of student characterisitics
across the threshold. Panel B checks for discontinuities in financial aid received
by students in the next year. Some of the estimates in Panel B are conditional on
enrolling in the next year (Enr.) and others are unconditional and have zeroes for
students who did not enroll. Panel C checks for changes in educational outcomes.
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Table 3.3: University Students, Pell This Year
A. Covar. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male White Black Hispanic Asian Cal. Year
Disc. 0.00999 -0.00162 0.0000615 -0.00278 -0.00140 0.0869*
(0.00713) (0.00578) (0.00584) (0.00620) (0.00306) (0.0463)
N 76708 76708 76708 76708 76708 76708
B. Fin. Pell Loans All Grants Loans Pell All Grants
Outcomes (Enr.) (Enr.) (Enr.) (Uncond.) (Uncond.) (Uncond.)
Disc. 259.9*** 749.0*** 312.1*** 444.7*** 150.1*** 182.1***
(36.35) (96.56) (47.57) (72.84) (29.10) (37.32)
N 47755 47755 47755 76708 76708 76708
C. Educ. Next Tot Enr Enr Grad CC Grad CC Grad 4yr Grad 4yr
Outcomes Hours CC 4yr in 0y in 1y in 0y in 1y
Disc. -0.00153 -0.000714 -0.00192 0.000158 -0.000161 0.00910 0.0167**
(0.189) (0.00225) (0.00719) (0.00156) (0.00214) (0.00730) (0.00786)
N 76708 76708 76708 45096 45096 67804 61273
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
This table considers outcomes for students who were enrolled in a university in
the year they turned 23. Panel A checks for balance of student characterisitics
across the threshold. Panel B checks for discontinuities in financial aid received
by students in the next year. Some of the estimates in Panel B are conditional on
enrolling in the next year (Enr.) and others are unconditional and have zeroes for
students who did not enroll. Panel C checks for changes in educational outcomes.
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Table 3.4: Community College Students, No Pell This Year
A. Covar. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male White Black Hispanic Asian Cal. Year
Disc. 0.00249 0.00348 -0.00537 -0.00722 0.00133 0.0346
(0.00645) (0.00547) (0.00544) (0.00620) (0.00195) (0.0444)
N 83506 83506 83506 83506 83506 83506
B. Fin. Pell Loans All Grants Loans Pell All Grants
Outcomes (Enr.) (Enr.) (Enr.) (Uncond.) (Uncond.) (Uncond.)
Disc. 288.7*** 156.0*** 329.9*** 107.6*** 176.9*** 202.3***
(14.33) (40.18) (16.41) (24.05) (8.690) (9.966)
N 114280 114280 114280 194994 194994 194994
C. Educ. Next Tot Enr Enr Grad CC Grad CC Grad 4yr Grad 4yr
Outcomes Hours CC 4yr in 0y in 1y in 0y in 1y
Disc. 0.369*** 0.00716 0.00220 -0.000267 0.00264 -0.000667 -0.000937
(0.0964) (0.00454) (0.00221) (0.00267) (0.00347) (0.000464) (0.00102)
N 194994 194994 128311 161470 161470 229166 63542
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
This table considers outcomes for students who were enrolled in a community
college in the year they turned 23. Panel A checks for balance of student charac-
terisitics across the threshold. Panel B checks for discontinuities in financial aid
received by students in the next year. Some of the estimates in Panel B are condi-
tional on enrolling in the next year (Enr.) and others are unconditional and have
zeroes for students who did not enroll. Panel C checks for changes in educational
outcomes.
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Table 3.5: Community College Students, Pell This Year
A. Covar. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male White Black Hispanic Asian Cal. Year
Disc. -0.000982 0.00781* 0.00182 -0.00623 -0.00108 -0.0421
(0.00475) (0.00454) (0.00269) (0.00393) (0.00174) (0.0298)
N 178355 178355 178355 178355 178355 178355
B. Fin. Pell Loans All Grants Loans Pell All Grants
Outcomes (Enr.) (Enr.) (Enr.) (Uncond.) (Uncond.) (Uncond.)
Disc. -43.90 103.2* -25.64 64.76* -22.64 -11.01
(32.80) (57.84) (37.64) (38.82) (27.00) (30.43)
N 52696 52696 52696 83506 83506 83506
C. Educ. Next Tot Enr Enr Grad CC Grad CC Grad 4yr Grad 4yr
Outcomes Hours CC 4yr in 0y in 1y in 0y in 1y
Discon. -0.0928 -0.00602 0.00444 0.00219 0.00699 0.000230 -0.000184
(0.156) (0.00687) (0.00342) (0.00444) (0.00580) (0.000245) (0.000706)
N 83506 83506 55407 69314 69314 97747 27658
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
This table considers outcomes for students who were enrolled in a community
college in the year they turned 23. Panel A checks for balance of student charac-
terisitics across the threshold. Panel B checks for discontinuities in financial aid
received by students in the next year. Some of the estimates in Panel B are condi-
tional on enrolling in the next year (Enr.) and others are unconditional and have
zeroes for students who did not enroll. Panel C checks for changes in educational
outcomes.
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Appendix A
College on the Cheap
A.1 College on the Cheap
A.1.1 Annexation/Campus Data Collection
Data on the dates of annexation was obtained in three ways. The first is
through information posted online on community college websites that detailed
historical annexations. The second is by using archives of newspapers covering
the votes on annexation. The third is by examining patterns of students payment
of in-district tuition. For each annexation. The ERC data provides information on
whether enrolled students paid in-district tuition. From this data I identified years
in which the fraction of students paying in-district tuition jumped substantially in
a K-12 district. These changes were then verified using news reports when pos-
sible. For additional information on the source for each annexation and campus
building date see this online spreadsheet: http://goo.gl/6sjDvz.
In order to assign opening dates for new campuses, I collected information
on existing campuses at the five community college taxing districts studied and
determined when they were opened using information from the community col-
lege websites. I then used latitude and longitude data on campuses and school
districts to map campuses to K-12 school districts.
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A.1.2 Additional years of data
To take advantage of additional variation in community college tuition caused
by annexation, I estimate the effect of annexation on enrollment for 1995 to 2012.
These results are in Table A.1 and include college/year fixed effects. In Column 1,
annexation is associated with a slightly smaller increase in sticker price of tuition.
The effect of annexation on community college enrollment is slightly larger with
the estimate being 3.7 pp as opposed to 3.2 pp. The effects for enrolling in dis-
trict and enrolling in no college are also larger than previous estimates but are still
highly statistically significant. However, there is still no measured effect of annex-
ation on enrollment at four-year colleges. The results for building a new campus
are similar when using all data but slightly attenuated. These results suggest that
the findings on enrollment are robust to using additional variation.1
A.1.3 Hours attempted
Another measure of educational attainment is the number of college credit
hours accumulated. The data contain information on the number of credit hours
attempted, which I will use as another measure of attainment. Unfortunately the
data do not contain information on credit hours passed during the relevant time
frame but credit hours attempted serves as a good intermediate indicator of credits
accumulated.
Panel A of Table A.2 shows that reduced tuition resulting from annexation
1Specifically, there was one additional community college that had any annexations and five
additional annexations from 2006-2012.
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Table A.1: Enrollment, All Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tuition Enr. CC Enr. In. Dist Enr. 4yr Enr None
Annexation -1.13∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ -0.0019 -0.035∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.0067) (0.0081) (0.013) (0.011)
Year and District FE X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X
College/Year FE X X X X X
New Campuses X X X X X
Mean of Dep Var 1.33 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.49
N 390237 390237 390237 390237 390237
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
This table considers the effect of annexation on immediate college enrollment
patterns using data from 1994-2012. The CC column examines enrollment in a
community college, 4yr considers enrollment in public universities, In Dist.
considers enrollment at the in-district community college, and Nowhere is an
indicator for not enrolling in any public colleges or universities. The rows at the
bottom indicate inclusion of controls for year and district fixed effects,
demographic characteristics including race and gender, and college by year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the K-12 District level and are in
parentheses with ∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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increased hours attempted at community colleges. After four years, annexation
had increased average credits attempted by 2 credit hours. There point estimates
on the increases in university credits are positive but are not statistically signifi-
cant. Unfortunately, the data on credits attempted does not extend far enough to
consider credits attempted at universities after 8 years which would give students
more time to transfer to community colleges.
Panel B of Table A.2 uses annexation as an instrument for attending a com-
munity college. The results have a similar pattern to Panel B of Table A.2 but scale
the coefficients by the number of students induced to attend community college.
Students induced to attend community college as a result of annexation increased
the number of credits attempted at community colleges after 6 years by 47.6 and
the overall number of credits by 58.9. These results suggest that reduced commu-
nity college tuition increased community college attendance and the students who
attended were engaged nearly enough credit hours for an associate’s degree.
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Table A.2: Hours Attempted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Reduced Univ. Credits Univ. Credits CC Credits CC Credits All Credits
Form after 4 yrs after 6 yrs after 4 yrs after 6 yrs after 6 yrs
Annexation 0.25 0.51 2.00*** 2.15*** 2.66*
(1.25) (1.34) (0.24) (0.25) (1.40)
B. Instrumental Univ. Credits Univ. Credits CC Credits CC Credits All Credits
Variables after 4 yrs after 6 yrs after 4 yrs after 6 yrs after 6 yrs
Attend CC 5.56 11.3 44.3*** 47.6*** 58.9**
(26.7) (28.0) (5.66) (6.32) (24.6)
Year and District FE X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X
College/Year FE X X X X X
New Campuses X X X X X
Mean of Dep Var 24.4 28.8 14.1 16.5 45.3
N 206370 206370 206370 206370 206370
This table considers the sum of hours attempted at community colleges and
universities after four and six years. Panel A presents the reduced form effect of
annexation on credits attempted and Panel B instruments for community college
attendance using annexation. Each column is a separate regression considering
the effect in the Xth year after high school. The rows at the bottom indicate
inclusion of controls for year and district fixed effects, the building of new
campuses, demographic characteristics including race and gender, and college by
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the K-12 district level and are in
parentheses with ∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Appendix B
Was That SMART?
The amount of the Pell Grant that students received at the discontinuity
changed over time. The largest amount was in the 2009-2010 school year of $976.
One concern is the change in majors occurring at the threshold may be due to in-
creased Pell Grants instead of incentives from the SMART Grant. Figure 11 shows
the estimates for junior and senior major at BYU and Texas as compared to the
minimum Pell Grant in that year. In every instance the largest discontinuity is in
the 2010-11 school despite the minimum Pell Grant falling to $555. In the year with
the largest effects, the Pell Grant is relatively modest at $555.
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Figure B.1: Estimates by Year vs Pell Grant
Texas
Junior Major Senior Major
BYU
Junior Major Senior Major
The estimated discontinuity for the impact of SMART Grants on majors is plotted
along with 95% confidence intervals. The years represent the end of a school year.
The triangles represent the A bandwidth of 1.1 is used for Texas and 2.5 is used for
BYU.
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